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OPEN CHAMBERS? 
Richard W. Painter* 
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE 
EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT. By Edward 
LazarU,S. New York: Times Books. 1998. Pp. xii, 576. $27.50. 
Edward Lazarus1 has written the latest account of what goes on 
behind the marble walls of the Supreme Court. His book is not the 
first to selectively reveal confidential communications between the 
Justices and their law clerks. Another book, Bob Woodward and 
Scott Armstrong's The Brethren2 achieved that distinction in 1979. 
Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Strug­
gles Inside the Supreme Court, however, adds a new twist. Whereas 
The Brethren was written by journalists who persuaded former law 
clerks to breach the confidences of the Justices, Lazarus was himself 
a law clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun. 
Closed Chambers is a well-written book. Lazarus's prose is con­
cise and colorful. His doctrinal discussions are alive with details 
from the lives of the persons who brought cases before the Court. 
Many of these were African-American capital defendants in the 
South ranging from the Scottsboro Boys in the 1930s, nine men who 
almost certainly did not commit the crime of rape for which eight of 
them were sentenced to die in Alabama (pp. 77-85), to Warren 
McCleskey, who was executed in 1991 for murdering an Atlanta 
police officer while participating in a robbery, although he may not 
have fired the fatal shots (pp. 170-81). The book's use of historical 
material provides perspective on how social norms and politics in­
fluence the Justices, as well as the Court's history of confrontation 
with other branches of government, from Chief Justice Taney's per­
nicious use of substantive due process to flout the Missouri Com­
promise in Dred Scott (pp. 246-47) to the Court's dismantling of 
state death penalty statutes in the 1960s and 1970s (pp. 86-118). Far 
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1984, Harvard; J.D. 1987, Yale. 
Professor Painter graduated from Yale Law School with Edward Lazarus and several of the 
former Supreme Court clerks mentioned in Closed Chambers. - Ed. I am grateful to Dean 
Anthony Kronman for helpful comments on this Book Review and to Tiffany Yonker for 
helpful research assistance. 
1. Mr. Lazarus is an Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of 
California. 
2. BOB WOODWARD & Seo= ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
CouRT (1979). But see infra note 84 (discussing memoirs written before The Brethren in 
which former clerks made limited disclosures, usually years after the death of the Justices for 
whom they clerked). 
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from being a digression, anecdote and history aptly frame Lazarus's 
portrait of the Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Nonetheless, many reviewers have criticized the book for a vari­
ety of inaccuracies3 and exaggerations.4 Others question the reality 
3. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Dissenting Opinion: A witness from inside the Supreme 
Court is not impressed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998 (book review) at 26 ("Closed Chambers is a 
worthwhile book for students of Supreme Court history, but it is not a book general readers 
should rely upon for an accurate and dependable contemporary portrait."). Several reviews, 
cited separately below, appear at JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAw (May 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt. 
edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm>. Ironically, most of the book's inaccuracies are not in the his­
torical material, but in Lazarus's account of the Court's more recent past. Lazarus describes 
Justice Souter as "a vocal dissenter in [Employment Div. v.j Smith," p. 511 n.*, even though 
Justice Souter was not even on the Court when Smith was decided. See David M. O'Brien, 
Breaching Confidence, Court Bashing, and Bureaucratic Justice, JURIST: BooKs-oN-LAw 
(May 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Brien> (pointing out this er­
ror); Edward Lazarus, Disturbing Truths, JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAW (July 1998) <http://jurist. 
law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revjul98.htm#Lazarus> (acknowledging this error in response to book 
reviews). Lazarus also reports that Justice O'Connor "so distrusted Brennan - for having 
hoodwinked her in some unnamed past case - that she refused to join any of his majority 
opinions for the Court," p. 277, a statement disproved by the fact that Justice O'Connor 
joined seven of Brennan's majority opinions in the year of Lazarus's clerkship alone, while 
Brennan joined seven of hers. See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 
851 n.104 (reviewing Closed Chambers) (citing seven majority opinions by Justice Brennan 
joined by Justice O'Connor); id. at 851 n.105 (citing seven majority opinions by Justice 
O'Connor joined by Justice Brennan); see also Garrow, supra (same). 
Lazarus reports that Chief Justice Rehnquist "relisted" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), postponing consideration of the petition for certiorari until the Justices' next 
weekly conference, because Rehnquist hoped "to push off oral argument until the fall . . .  
[and] delay a final ruling until sometime in 1993, long after the [1992] election." P. 463. 
According to Lazarus, "Rehnquist did not relist Casey only once; he did it several weeks 
running (exactly how many is not known)." P. 463. A call to the office of the Supreme Court 
Clerk, however, confirms that the petition in Casey, originally scheduled for conference on 
January 10, 1992, was relisted exactly once, for the conference on January 17, and that the 
order granting certiorari was filed on January 21. See Kozinski, supra, at 852; see also Gar­
row, supra (reporting that relisting "is standard practice when the Court reformulates the 
question that a case presents, as it did in Casey. Rehnquist may or may not have wanted to 
delay Casey, but he did not do what Closed Chambers says he did."). 
Toward the end of the book, Lazarus states that, when convicted murderer Robert Alton 
Harris was strapped in a chair in California's gas chamber, "two minutes later, astonishingly, 
the phone rang. It was Judge Warren Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit, issuing yet another 
stay." P. 508. What is astonishing about this account is not Judge Pregerson's telephone call 
(the Ninth Circuit issued several last minute stays in this case alone), but the fact that 
Lazarus, who clerked for Judge William Norris on the Ninth Circuit when Judge Pregerson 
was his colleague, apparently does not know that "Warren" appears nowhere in the name of 
Judge Harry Pregerson. Two pages earlier, Lazarus states that a Ninth Circuit panel "consist­
ing of Judges Richard Alarcon, Melvin Brunetti and John Noonan" granted, over Judge 
Noonan's dissent, the State of California's petition to dissolve a district court's stay in the 
Harris case. P. 506. This is true, except for the fact that Judge Alarcon's first name is Arthur, 
not Richard. See Kozinski, supra, at 854 & n.120 (noting that this error is "particularly em­
barrassing as Lazarus clerked on the Ninth Circuit (one floor above Alarcon) and regularly 
appears before the court in his capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Cen­
tral District of California"). Lazarus would have benefited enormously in his discussion of 
the Harris case - in more respects than simply getting the judges' names right - if he had 
read Judge Noonan's detailed discussion of the case in the Stanford Law Review. See John T.  
Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v .  Vasquez, 45 STAN. L.  REv. 1011 (1993). Appar­
ently, however, Lazarus settled for reading, and referring to, Judge Noonan's brief editorial 
in the New York Times. Pp. 508 & 546 n.21 (citing John T. Noonan, Jr., Should State Execu­
tions Run on Schedule? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at A17). 
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of Lazarus's vision of nonpoliticized Supreme Court decisionmak­
ing, based on "good faith and self-denial,"5 which he believes to 
have been "vanquished" by the Robert Bork confirmation hear­
ings. 6 Finally, Lazarus has been taken to task for overstating the 
Errors such as these could have been avoided if Lazarus had given as much attention to 
detail as he gave to his prose. 
4. The most egregious exaggeration in the book is Lazarus's statement that the Court's 
October Term 1988 "must rank with the New Deal watershed of 1937 and the year of Brown 
[v. Board of Education], 1954, as the most decisive in this century." Pp. 261-62. The 1988-89 
Term did include some important cases. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
{1989) {holding that provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that direct the federal 
Sentencing Commission to set Sentencing Guidelines did not violate the separation of pow­
ers doctrine); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 {1989) (striking down Rich­
mond's preference for minority contractors); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking 
down a state statute prohibiting flag burning); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
{1989) (interpreting the Establishment Clause to bar a holiday display on government prop­
erty); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (partially affirming Roe v. 
Wade) . The 1988-89 Term, however, did not include any of the decisions that rank with the 
1954 decision in Brown v. Board as forming the foundation of modern constitutional law, 
such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 {1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), both of which dramatically expanded the rights of criminal defendants; Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that a statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives 
violated a substantive due process right to privacy; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which 
expanded this right to cover abortion; and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
which {happily for Lazarus) made it extraordinarily difficult for public figures, such as 
Supreme Court Justices, to sue for libel. 
As far as "watershed" constitutional crisis is concerned, the 1988-89 Term was insignifi­
cant, particularly when compared with President Roosevelt's frontal assault on the Court in 
the 1930s, President Eisenhower's decision to enforce the Court's desegregation decrees with 
federal troops in the 1950s, and the Court's unanimous order that President Nixon turn 
White House tapes over to federal prosecutors in 1974. Lazarus's exaggeration of the impor­
tance of his clerkship Term simply is not in line with historical reality. See Garrow, supra 
note 3 ("Lazarus's characterization of his own year (in such language) is risible."); O'Brien, 
supra note 3 (concluding that this characterization of Lazarus's own term "raises questions 
about Lazarus's sense of judgment - judgment of history and other matters"). 
5. P. 249. See David Kairys, Reason Worship, JURIST: BOOKS-ON-LAW (May 1998) 
<http://jurist.Iaw.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Kairys> ("The central problem for 
Lazarus and this book - and for this dominant mode of legal scholarship - is to document 
the norm, compared to which the injection of politics can be described as a deviation."). 
Kairys correctly points out that most of the Court's opinions that Lazarus admires, such as 
Brown v. Board, involved a heavy dose of politics, not mere legal reasoning. In another 
example, Lazarus claims that the Court of Chief Justice John Marshall "overcame sharp divi­
sions and succeeded in separating the interests of the Court and of the Constitution from 
politics." P. 10. Kairys points out, however, that Chief Justice Marshall, in the most famous 
case of that era, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was under threat of 
impeachment by the Republicans if he did not rule in their favor. Marshall's opinion thus 
"weaves through a range of issues to establish judicial review without really using it," and is 
"not an opinion one can hold up as free of contemporary politics, faults of legal reasoning, or 
close attention to practical and political results." Kairys, supra. 
6. P. 249. Politicized confirmation battles, however, are nothing new. The acrimony and 
accusation that characterized the hearings for Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence Thomas in 
1991 echoed the atmosphere surrounding Justice Abraham Fortas's resignation and President 
Nixon's unsuccessful nomination of two conservative jurists, Clement Haynsworth and 
Harrold Carswell, to the Court in 1969. Indeed, President Wilson in 1916 triggered what was 
probably the most divisive confirmation battle of the 1\ventieth Century by nominating Louis 
Brandeis, a Boston lawyer who was viciously attacked for being both a Progressive and a Jew. 
See ALPHEus THOMAS MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN's LIFE 466-67 (1946). 
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role of clerks in influencing the decisions of the Court.7 
Surprisingly, despite some glaring parallels to more recent confirmation battles, the 
Brandeis nomination goes virtually unmentioned in Lazarus's lengthy historical expose. At 
his confirmation hearing, belated charges of ethical impropriety were raised against Brandeis 
by accusers who, at the time the alleged conduct occurred over six years earlier, had publicly 
said nothing critical of him, but who now, with the encouragement of several Senators and 
their staff, came forward in the Senate committee room. The accusations - that Brandeis 
had been dishonest as well as disloyal to his clients - fit conveniently into anti- Semitic ste­
reotypes. The testimony of Brandeis's accusers, however, revealed the hypocrisy of Boston's 
predominantly Protestant bar, which showed no greater sensitivity to conflicts in legal repre­
sentations. The accusations were more about politics than ethics, and the vote to confirm 
Brandeis was strictly along party lines. See Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. (1916), reprinted in part and discussed 
in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. p AINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL REsPONSI­
BILITIES OF TiiE LAWYER 382-423 (1997). 
Although the Bork confirmation fight resembled the Brandeis episode in its focus on the 
nominee's ideology, the Thomas nomination was a closer parallel in two other aspects: a 
transparent role of race and ethnicity in the deliberations and last-minute accusations of im­
propriety against the nominee. President Bush chose Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall, 
and many civil rights groups that had opposed Bork were reluctant to oppose Thomas, even 
though they detested his judicial philosophy. Pp. 451, 455. The hearings took their accusa­
tory turn after Senate Judiciary Committee staff members leaked to the press excerpts from 
an FBI interview in which Anita Hill said that Thomas had sexually harassed her seven years 
earlier when she had worked for him at the EEO C. Thomas flatly denied Hill's accusations 
and for good measure accused the committee of subjecting him to a "high tech lynching." P. 
454. Passions were inflamed and Thomas's approval rating in the black community soared. 
See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Putney Swope Is Dead, NE WSDAY, Nov. 8, 1992, at 40 (reporting 
that immediately following the last round of hearings, "Thomas' approval rating among black 
Americans, previously hovering at 54 percent, soared to 80 percent"). It was also apparent 
that, for some members of the Senate, hypocrisy was in the air, and that this might only be 
the first round in a political war of attrition over sexual harassment allegations, which when 
denied under oath, can be compounded by allegations of perjury. After all was said and 
done, the 52-48 vote to confirm was mostly along party lines, with 41 Republicans and 11 
Democrats voting to confirm and 2 Republicans and 46 Democrats voting no. 
7. See Garrow, supra note 3 ("Lazarus's writing is often better than his judgment. Clerks 
often suffer from an exaggerated sense of their own importance."); O'Brien, supra note 3 
(criticizing Lazarus's portrayal of the Court "as 'clerk driven' and composed of 'editor Jus­
tices"' in part because "clerks do not write on entirely clean slates and their drafts must pass 
muster with the justices"); Mark Tushnet, Hype and History, JURI ST: BooKs-oN-LAw (May 
1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Tushnet> ("I'd offer . .. [a] 'null 
hypothesis' to test Lazarus's account: No law clerk has a substantial impact on the outcome 
- a Justice's vote - in any significant case, and no law clerk has a more-than-trivial impact 
on the core legal rules stated in the Court's opinions. Nothing in Lazarus's account per­
suades me that the null hypothesis is false."); Lyle Denniston, 'Closed Chambers': Law 
Clerk's Revenge, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 12, 1998, at F5 (describing the book as "captivated 
by the hilariously foolish notion that the Supreme Court is really run by scheming clerks"). 
Dean Anthony Kronman and Kenneth Starr, among others, have correctly pointed out 
that judges delegate too much of their work, particularly opinion writing, to clerks. See 
ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LosT LAWYER 347-51 (1993) (discussing the "increasingly im­
portant role that law clerks play in the process of opinion writing" and noting both "their 
immaturity and own self-conscious lack of judgment"); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme 
Court and the Future of the Federal Judiciary, 32 Aruz. L. REv. 211, 214-16 {1990). Lazarus 
converts this observation into a conspiracy theory and dwells on unattributed accounts of 
how a "cabal" of conservative clerks, most of whom he knew personally, plotted to influence 
a few cases. See, e.g., pp. 251-87 (a 36-page chapter entitled "The Cabal Against the Libs"); 
pp. 314-15 (describing cabal influence in the Kennedy chambers in Patterson); pp. 321-22 
(same); p. 391 (describing efforts by Andrew McBride, an O' Connor clerk who "presided 
over the cabal," to persuade O' Connor to reverse Roe in Webster); p. 405 (describing cabal 
influence on the Rehnquist chambers in Webster); p. 419 {describing a shoving match be-
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Although these criticisms collectively cast doubt on the substan­
tive merit of Closed Chambers, this review will not embark on al­
ready well-traveled ground by dissecting the book in search of 
further inaccuracies. Rather, this review will address ethical lapses 
in the book that have troubled the author of this review8 and 
others, ranging from Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Anthony Kronman9, the 
Dean of the Yale Law School to Tom Goldstein, the Dean of the 
Columbia School of Journalism.10 
tween McBride and a liberal clerk that drove them both into the courtyard fountain); p. 501 
(describing efforts by cabal members to shrink the Court's habeas docket). Both conserva· 
tive and liberal commentators, however, point out that Lazarus fails to demonstrate any spe· 
cific influence such a "cabal" actually had. See Kozinski, supra note 3, at 866-71; Tushnet, 
supra ("Lazarus doesn't convince me that there was anything special about the cabal, or even 
that it was particularly influential."). In Webster, for example, although Lazarus asserts that 
an O'Connor clerk presided over the cabal, p. 391, Tushnet observes that "in the end, Justice 
O'Connor did what she wanted, not what the cabal wanted." Tushnet, supra. With respect to 
Patterson v. McClean Credit, Tushnet points out that the circumstantial evidence all suggests 
that Justice Kennedy made up his own mind to change his vote and deny Brenda Patterson's 
claim under the 1866 Civil Rights Act for racial harassment on the job, rather than collapsing, 
as Lazarus claims, pp. 314-15, under pressure from the cabal. Tushnet, supra. 
A less glamorous but more useful exercise than publishing this courthouse gossip would 
have been to compare clerks' draft opinions and bench memoranda in the publicly available 
Brennan and Marshall papers with the final product in the United States Reporter. Another 
useful endeavor would have been to look at the more technical areas of the law - securities, 
antitrust, and other areas of statutory interpretation - in which the Justices do not always 
have a firm grasp of the relevant subject matter, and are more likely to rely on clerks to 
formulate legal reasoning. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider 
Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153 (1998) (criticizing the Court's 
confusing and incoherent body of case law governing insider trading). Discussion of cases in 
these areas, which go unmentioned in Closed Chambers, might have further supported the 
point that clerks' influence is excessive. 
8. See Richard W. Painter, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 
1998, at A23 (criticizing Lazarus for betraying the Court's confidences); see also Gretchen 
Craft Rubin, Betraying a Trust, WASH. PoST, June 17, 1998, at A27 (making same point). 
9. See Kozinski, supra note 3, at 838-49. Dean Kronman wrote an endorsement for the 
back cover of CLOSED CHAMBERS but has subsequently expressed concern about the serious 
and troubling ethical issues raised by Lazarus's reporting of events during his clerkship. See 
Letter from Anthony T .  Kronman, Dean, Yale Law School, to Richard Painter, Professor, 
University of Illinois College of Law (Mar. 26, 1999) (on file with author) ("[I]t is now my 
settled view that the only workable rule regarding the disclosure of confidences by law clerks 
is one that requires them to treat as confidential (and hence nondisclosable) any information 
not in the public record that pertains to events occurring during the period of their clerk­
ships-regardless of the source of the information (firsthand or indirect) and regardless of 
the time it is received (during the clerkship or after). As the debate surrounding CLOSED 
CHAMBERS demonstrates, it is impossible to determine, after the fact, where a clerk who 
reveals confidences learned them, and when he or she did. A blanket prohibition against 
disclosure seems to me the only sensible approach."). Dean Kronman's written endorsement 
of CLOSED CHAMBERS has been withdrawn and will not appear on the paperback edition of 
the book. See Tony Mauro, Yale Dean Caught in Book Controversy: Head of Law School 
Apologizes for Blurb on High Court Tell-All, USA TODAY, May 10, 1999, at lOA. 
10. See Adam Cohen, Courting Controversy, TIME, Mar. 30, 1998, at 31 ("It seems to me 
the most fundamental breach of confidentiality you can think of." (quoting Tom Goldstein) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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To the extent Lazarus disclosed confidential communications 
that took place during his clerkship, he breached not only the trust 
of the Justices, but a longstanding expectation of confidentiality 
that is now embodied in a written Code of Conduct for Supreme 
Court Clerks.11 Because portions of the book quote extensively 
from nonpublic documents,12 somebody also may have violated fed­
eral statutes prohibiting unauthorized removal of documents from 
the Supreme Court building.13 Unfortunately, Lazarus darkens the 
cloud of suspicion by refusing to reveal his sources, many of whom 
are probably former Supreme Court clerks, and by refusing to dis­
close where he got the nonpublic documents that he discusses in 
Closed Chambers. 
These ethical lapses are the principal focus of this review for two 
reasons. First, legal scholars, particularly those who teach profes­
sional responsibility and recommend students for judicial clerk­
ships, need to ascertain the rationale for and extent of a law clerk's 
duty of confidentiality. Second, efforts to conceal breaches of that 
duty by Lazarus and his sources are responsible for the book's most 
significant substantive shortcoming, its lack of verifiability. 
Lazarus is loath to disclose his sources, and does not even pro­
vide the complete text of documents that he obtained from the 
Court's files. His readers, therefore, must take at face value his 
representations about what was said or written, by whom, and in 
what context. The usual support provided for a scholarly work, ci­
tation to specific documents in the public domain or interviews with 
identified persons, is absent, and Lazarus acknowledges this weak­
ness in his introduction.14 The usual safeguard for journalists' sto­
ries in magazines and newspapers, careful scrutiny by fact 
checkers,15 presumably was not employed here, and in any event 
11. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES [hereinafter CoDE OF CONDUCT] Canons 2, 3 (1989). 
12. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for "[w]hoever embezzles, 
steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, 
sells, conveys or disposes of any record .. . of the United States or of any department or 
agency thereof," and "[w]hoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert 
it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted"); 18 
U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for anyone who "willfully and unlawfully 
conceals, removes . . .  or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record . . .  docu­
ment, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United 
States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States"). 
These statutes are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 40-43. 
14. P. xii ("I recognize that this approach makes it more difficult for the reader to evalu­
ate some of my assertions, but I have made this sacrifice in order to further shield the identity 
of those who helped me."). 
15. Recent high-profile fabrication incidents have highlighted the need for this safeguard. 
See Robin Pogrebin, Columnist's Ouster Pushes Editors to Look Inward, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 1998, at D7 (discussing impact of the Boston Globe columnist Patricia Smith's resignation 
because of fabricated stories); Robin Pogrebin, Rechecking a Writer's Facts, A Magazine Un-
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would not have been successful given Lazarus's reliance on so many 
anonymous sources. Indeed, it is unlikely that anyone other than 
Lazarus himself has comprehensive knowledge of the sources he 
used. 
Finally, Lazarus's breach of confidence raises an unsettling 
question that undermines his work's credibility: If Lazarus and his 
sources betrayed the Justices' trust, how can readers easily dismiss 
the possibility of fabrication somewhere along his undisclosed chain 
of information? Under the circumstances, and given the substan­
tive inaccuracies that other reviewers have already identified in the 
book,16 this reviewer finds such a leap of faith to be unfathomable. 
Part I of this review discusses specific ways in which the author 
and his sources breached confidence. Section I.D responds to the 
author's arguments in defense of his enterprise. Sections LE, F, 
and G then discuss how these disclosures undermine rather than 
enhance the substantive merits of Closed Chambers, and conclude 
that those portions of the book that rely on the public record are 
the strongest while the portions that rely on insiders' disclosures are 
the weakest. Lazarus's recounting of confidential communications 
adds little to his account, and his obsession with the clerks rather 
than the Justices themselves is a distraction that undermines what 
could have been an insightful account of an important juncture in 
the Court's history. 
Part II discusses the relationship between Justice and law clerk 
and the importance of confidentiality to that relationship. Part II 
also addresses an argument that is sometimes made for narrowly 
construing the duty of confidentiality in the Justice-clerk relation­
ship: the importance of scholarly and public scrutiny of the 
Supreme Court.17 Ultimately, however, this argument is unpersua­
sive, in part because substantial damage to the Justice-clerk rela­
tionship ensues from such breaches of confidence, and in part 
because there is relatively little value in selective disclosures by for­
mer clerks. Disclosures about the Court's decisionmaking process 
are better made by the Justices themselves, as when they give or 
covers Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at Al (recounting how writer Stephen Glass was 
fired when the New Republic discovered that he made up part or all of 27 of 41 articles over 
three years). 
16. See supra note 3. 
17. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 31 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor of Law at the 
University of Southern California and a friend of Lazarus, as saying that back-room politics 
that affect case outcomes is "exactly what should be exposed to the public"). Professor 
Chemerinsky has written a review of CLOSED CHAMBERS that is more positive than most 
other reviews of the book, and that is devoted in susbstantial part to refuting claims made by 
Judge Kozinski and the author of this review that the book improperly breaches confidences 
and relies upon improperly obtained documents. See Erwin Chemerinsky,.Opening CLOSED 
CHAMBERS, 108 YALE L.J.1087 {1999). 
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bequest their papers to libraries or engage in cooperative endeavors 
with biographers. 
I. CLOSED CHAMBERS 
A. The Breaches of Confidence 
Lazarus begins his book acknowledging that "[t]he clerkship 
gave me unusual access to sources knowledgeable about the Court 
and armed me with questions others might not think to ask" (p. xi). 
He goes on to insist, however, that 
I have been careful to avoid disclosing information I am privy to 
solely because I was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun. In 
other words, I have reconstructed what I knew and supplemented that 
knowledge through primary sources (either publicly available or pro­
vided by others) and dozens of interviews conducted over the past 
five years.18 
In addition, in various public statements, but not in the book itself, 
Lazarus has claimed that Justice Blackmun knew about the book 
while it was being written.19 Justice Blackmun, who died a year 
after the book's publication, did not confirm or deny prior knowl­
edge of the book, although persons in his office denied that he 
knew about it prior to publication.20 There is no evidence that Jus­
tice Blackmun gave Lazarus permission to use confidential commu­
nications in writing the book, and Lazarus himself acknowledges 
that Justice Blackmun was unaware of the details of the book.21 
Unfortunately, portions of Closed Chambers directly repudiate 
Lazarus's claim that he has not disclosed information he was privy 
18. P. xi (emphasis added). As Judge Kozinski points out, "The word 'solely' is empha­
sized because it is crucial to Lazarus's ethical hairsplitting. Lazarus takes the position that he 
did not breach any confidences because all the inside information he discloses, he learned -
or relearned - after he left the Court." Kozinski, supra note 3, at 838. In a later editorial, 
Lazarus claims that he "omitted from my book matters I knew only because I served as a 
clerk (including every discussion I had with my boss, Justice Blackmun)." Edward Lazarus, 
The Supreme Court Must Bear Scrutiny, WASH. PosT, July 6, 1998, at A19. At least with 
respect to Lazarus's conversations with Justice Blackmun, this claim is demonstrably false. 
See infra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
19. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Interview with Edward Lazarus, 
JURIST: BooKs-oN-LAw (May 1998) <htt p://jurist .l a w .p i t t . e d u/ la w b o o ks/ 
revmay98.htm#'Ii'ans> [hereinafter Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus] ("Justice 
Blackmun has known since the book's inception that I was writing it, and we discussed the 
book and corresponded about it on many occasions."). The exact moment of the book's 
"inception" is unclear, although Lazarus claims to have been inspired to write the book dur­
ing the confirmation hearings for Justice Thomas. See id. 
20. See Joan Biskupic, Book Breaks Silence of Supreme Court, WASH. PoST, Mar. 4, 1998, 
at AS ("Blackmun retired in 1994 but still goes daily to his office at the court and some 
people close to him said he was unaware until yesterday that his former clerk was publishing 
a book."). Despite protestations to the contrary by Lazarus, see Collins & Skover, Interview 
with Lazarus, supra note 19, The Washington Post has not retracted this story. 
21. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I never discussed with 
the Justice the intimate details of the book, and he was not a source for the book."). 
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to solely because of his clerkship.22 Lazarus reports that early in his 
clerkship he had a telephone conversation with Blackmun in which 
he advised Blackmun how to vote in a case, and that Blackmun 
took Lazarus's advice: 
I told Blackmun that I thought [Justice] Marshall's dissent [from the 
stay in Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 125 (1988)], though fairly 
convincing, felt premature to me and also prejudged some legal issues 
. . . . We talked for a while, back and forth, question and answer .... 
In the end, the Justice chose not to join Marshall's dissent. [p. 46] 
Lazarus also reveals that as a clerk for Justice Blackmun, he was 
given "exacting instructions about how to handle the emergency 
death cases, including explicit warnings not to be overly influenced 
by abolitionists from the Brennan or Marshall chambers" (p. 269). 
Later in the book, Lazarus discusses Justice Blackmun's reaction to 
the conference in which the Justices decided which issues to hear in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,23 then quotes from a 
bench memo he wrote to Blackmun about Webster (pp. 395-96), and 
finally relates Blackmun's tepid reaction to the Justices' conference 
on the merits of Webster. 24 
Lazarus's disclosure of his own conversations and correspon­
dence with Justice Blackmun, however, is less significant than his 
reports about communications between other clerks and their Jus­
tices. Lazarus may have overheard some of these communications 
when he was at the Court. In many instances, however, other clerks 
may have told Lazarus about their own communications with their 
Justices. In still other instances Lazarus's account may be based on 
second- and third-hand reports of what clerks remember having 
overheard. Because Lazarus does not identify his sources, there is 
no way for the reader to tell which is which. 
For example, Lazarus gives a detailed account of a meeting be­
tween Justice Kennedy and two of his clerks, Paul Cappuccio, for­
merly a Scalia clerk, and Harry Litman, formerly a Marshall clerk, 
in which the two "vied for his critical vote" in Webster "with abso­
lute abandon": 
Cappuccio, much like McBride in O'Connor's Chambers, pressed for 
Kennedy to overturn Roe and adopt Scalia's Michael H. approach to 
due process. Over and over, Cappuccio reminded Kennedy that the 
Court's foray into Roe-style substantive due process had originated in 
22. Lazarus also discusses his initial interview with Justice Blackmun. In the interview, 
Blackmun "asked me how I would feel about working for the man who had written Roe." P. 
334. Justice Blackmun also "insisted that his was the least desirable clerkship at the Court, in 
part because his colleagues were more intelligent and better teachers than he." P. 23. 
23. See p. 334 ("I still remember Justice Blackmun telling us about the conference vote, 
his face impassive, his voice wavering between defiance and resignation."). 
24. See p. 401 ("In any event, I stayed in my office and waited for Blackmun to come 
through my door on the way to his own. I caught his eye as he slipped quietly by, and he 
gave a little shake of his head, then whispered, 'We'll see."'). 
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the abomination of Dred Scott .... Cappuccio insisted that substantive 
due process - as evident from both Dred Scott and Roe - was a 
doctrine that corrupted law with political judgment. Accordingly, 
overturning Roe was not only proper but imperative. 
On the other side, Litman's argument focused on the conse­
quences of overruling Roe. As a jurisprudential matter, Litman sug­
gested that there could be no meaningful line drawn between Roe and 
Griswold, the contraception case Kennedy had referred to approv­
ingly at his confirmation hearings. Both decisions were based on the 
same elastic Harlanesque concept of due process and, indeed, relied 
on many of the same precedents .... [L]ogically, dumping Roe meant 
dumping Griswold and everything in between. 
The meeting was among the most dramatic of the term, a tug-of­
war for Kennedy's mind, conducted by two of the Court's smartest 
and fastest-thinking clerks (who notably, were also good friends). 
Still with oral argument upon them, the discussion ended inconclu­
sively. [pp. 394-95] 
Lazarus himself could not have witnessed what was said at this pri­
vate discussion between Justice Kennedy and his clerks.25 Nor is 
the discussion a matter of public record in the Brennan or Marshall 
papers, or anywhere else. Lazarus could have learned about the 
discussion from a Kennedy clerk who was present, or from some­
one else who overheard the discussion or heard about it from some­
one who was present. If so, someone breached Justice Kennedy's 
confidence in order for Lazarus to learn what was said. Alterna­
tively, someone may have made this discussion up.26 Breach of 
confidence, fabrication, or perhaps a little of both, underlies 
Lazarus's account, but without disclosure of his sources, we have no 
way of knowing what was said and whether confidences were 
breached. What we do know is that any such discussion between 
Justice Kennedy and his clerks, if it occurred, almost certainly was 
intended to be confidential. 
With respect to the documents that Lazarus used to write the 
book, he initially represents that his sources are the publicly avail­
able Brennan and Marshall papers "[u]nless otherwise noted" (p. 
xi, n.*). However, in discussing Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, Lazarus explicitly claims to be using documents, including 
a draft opinion purportedly written by the Chief Justice, that are 
not part of the public record: 
25. Lazarus claims not to have known about goings on in Justice Kennedy's chambers at 
the time: "In the Blackmun Chambers, I remember having only a relatively vague sense of 
the tempest brewing in these decisive quarters." P. 395. 
26. It is also possible that Lazarus reconstructed the argument from bench memoranda 
obtained from the Kennedy chambers, in which case there may have been no actual conver­
sation at all. 
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Previous "insider" accounts of Webster have made no mention of this 
draft or the crucial correspondence that followed it. They pieced to­
gether their versions of the story based mainly on the Thurgood 
Marshall or William Brennan Papers, neither of which, for obvious 
reasons, contain the private letters sent within the conservative caucus 
of the Rehnquist Court. Webster is only one example, albeit a glaring 
one, of how dramatically the presently available paper trail can seri­
ously mislead students of the Court. [p. 402 n. *] 
Lazarus thus goes beyond "the presently available paper trail" to 
discuss a draft opinion and "crucial correspondence" that some­
body obtained from the Court's confidential files. Lazarus also 
cites and discusses a post-conference letter on Webster from 
Kennedy to Rehnquist that is not a part of the public record: 
Other commentators have suggested that Kennedy's position was less 
firm in rejecting Roe: for example, that while disapproving of Roe he 
favored standing by the decision because of stare decisis concerns. 
See James Simon, The Center Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the 
Rehnquist Court (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995) pp. 135-36. 
This is an error, and an important one given the key role Kennedy 
subsequently played in preserving Roe in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey. As Kennedy characterized his own view in a postconference 
letter to Rehnquist, he explicitly favored overturning Roe. Past com­
mentators have been misled at least in part by the fact that the con­
firming Kennedy letter does not appear in the Thurgood Marshall 
Papers because, as with other telling correspondence, it was circulated 
only to the Court's conservatives. [p. 400 n. *] 
Lazarus insists that he knew nothing about these documents when 
he clerked for the Court the year Webster was decided.27 Once 
again, however, his refusal to identify his sources makes his state­
ments in his own defense impossible to verify. 
How did Lazarus, years after his clerkship, examine documents 
that he acknowledges are still not available to the public? If he did 
not remove the documents from the Court during his clerkship, two 
other possibilities remain: either someone permitted him to enter 
the building to review these documents after his clerkship was over 
(an unlikely possibility) or someone removed the documents from 
the Court and allowed Lazarus to examine them. In either case, the 
27. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I didn't know, for ex­
ample, that the conservative Justices in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services were caucus­
ing behind the backs of the liberals, and circulating internal drafts that the liberals never saw 
on it, and that never made it into the Marshall papers. I learned that years after I left the 
Court. So, obviously, I'm not breaking any ethical obligation of mine by publishing that in a 
book."). Professor Chemerinsky in his review raises the possibility that Lazarus never saw 
the documents in question but reconstructed them from interviews with "[i)ndividuals with 
strong recollections of the documents." Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1101. This, however, 
is very unlikely given the detailed paraphasing and extensive quotation from these docu­
ments in Closed Chambers. Furthermore, even after the removal of these documents was 
raised by the author of this review, see Painter, supra note 8, Lazarus has not denied having 
seen the documents and refuses to elaborate on how he came to know of their contents. 
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conduct in question could have been authorized by one of the Jus­
tices. Lazarus himself, however, points out that these documents 
existed only in the files of the conservative Justices (pp. 400, 402), 
making authorization for their use in a book by a former clerk to 
Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, very unlikely.28 
Other portions of the book appear to be based on written mem­
oranda and e-mail communications taken by somebody, or by sev­
eral persons, from the Supreme Court building.29 Once again, it is 
possible that a Justice authorized their removal. If, however, there 
was no authorization, the same issues as with the Webster papers 
come to the fore. Were these materials removed from the Supreme 
Court without authorization and, if so, by whom? 
B. The Code of Conduct 
In March 1989, during Lazarus's clerkship, the Supreme Court 
promulgated a Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Clerks.3° Ca­
non 1 of the Code provides that "[a] law clerk should observe high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary may be preserved" and that "[t]he provisions of this Code 
should be construed and applied to further that objective."31 Ca­
non 2 provides that a "law clerk owes the Justice and the Court 
28. Speculation has focused on the chambers of Justice O'Connor, several of whose 
clerks from the 1 988-89 term are featured prominently in the book. See Garrow, supra note 3 
(stating that Lazarus's account of Webster is based "upon copies of documents obtained from 
O'Connor's file"). Of the O'Connor clerks, one, Daniel Mandi!, "had primary responsibility 
for the case." P. 391. 
29. See, e.g., p. 265 (quoting an e-mail from Andrew McBride to his fellow conservatives 
in mid-September 1988, as stating "Every time I draw blood I'll think of what they did to 
Robert H. Bork"); p. 269 (quoting and identifying the exact date of a cabal member's exhor­
tation to his comrades to increase the number of successful executions, but not disclosing the 
medium of communication used to relay this message); see also Letter from Judge Alex 
Kozinski to Edward Lazarus (Sept. 16, 1998) (on file with author) (requesting copies of docu­
ments referred to in Closed Chambers but apparently unavailable in the Marshall Papers or 
in any other public source, including: 
1) All correspondence between Justice Kennedy and other Justices in Patterson v. Mc­
Lean Credit Union; in particular, all correspondence between Justices Kennedy and 
Brennan. Pages 309-12. 
2) With respect to Tompkins v. Texas, a copy of Justice Kennedy's memo explaining his 
switch on the Batson issue and any other documents written by Justice Kennedy ex­
plaining his views of this case. Pages 67-68. 
3) Andrew McBride's memo regarding Teague v. Lane. Pages 499-502. 
4) The memos written by Justice O'Connor's clerks espousing competing views of how 
Webster should be decided. Pages 390-94. 
5) Chief Justice Rehnquist's draft of the Webster opinion and the correspondence 
among the Justices regarding this draft. Pages 402-07, 423. 
6) Justice Kennedy's letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist [about Webster] . 
7) The Court's internal correspondence concerning Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Pages 
462-81.). 
30. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11. 
31. CooE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 1. 
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complete confidentiality, accuracy and loyalty,"32 and that "[t]he 
Justice relies on confidentiality in discussing performance of judicial 
duties."33 Canon 2 also states that each law clerk "is in a position to 
receive highly confidential circulations from the chambers of other 
Justices, and owes a duty of confidentiality with respect to such ma­
terial similar to the duty owed to the Justice employing the clerk." 
Canon 3 reiterates that the "relationship between Justice and law 
clerk is essentially a confidential one" and provides that "[a] law 
clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential informa­
tion received in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor should the 
law clerk employ such information for personal gain. "34 Canon 3 
also states specifically that "[t]he law clerk should take particular 
care that Court documents not available to the public are not taken 
from the Court building or handled so as to compromise their confi­
dentiality within chambers or the Court building in general."35 
In 1981, the Judicial Conference of the United States promul­
gated a Code of Conduct for Law Clerks,36 and in 1996 a Code of 
Conduct for Judicial Employees37 which applies to clerks and other 
employees of the Judicial Branch other than employees of the 
Supreme Court. The Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees man­
dates confidentiality,38 and more explicitly states a point that is also 
obvious from any fair construction of the Supreme Court's Code: 
"A former judicial employee should observe the same restrictions 
on disclosure of confidential information that apply to a current ju­
dicial employee."39 
C. Federal Statutes 
Unauthorized removal and use of documents from the Court's 
files are governed not only by the Supreme Court's Code of Con-
32. CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 2. Canon 2 later states that "[s]eparate 
and apart from the duty owed by each law clerk to the appointing Justice is the duty owed by 
each law clerk to the Court as a body." 
33. CoDE OF CoNDuCT, supra note 11, Canon 2. The Code explicitly analogizes the rela­
tionship between Justice and law clerk to a relationship between two lawyers: "The relation­
ship between the Justice and the law clerk has several facets: employer-employee, teacher­
student, and lawyer-lawyer." CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 2. 
34. CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 3. 
35. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 3. 
36. CoDE OF CoNDuCT FOR LAW CLERKS (Jud. Conf. of the United States 1981). 
37. CODE OF CoNDuCT FOR JuorcIAL EMPLOYEES (Jud. Conf. of the United States 1996). 
38. CoDE OF CoNDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D) ("A judi­
cial employee should never disclose any confidential information received in the course of 
official duties ... nor should a judicial employee employ such information for personal 
gain."). 
39. CoDE OF CoNDuCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D). Lazarus 
has argued to the contrary that the Supreme Court's Code does not require a clerk to keep 
the confidences of the Justices once the clerkship is over. See infra text accompanying notes 
51-55. 
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duct, but also by the United States criminal code. 18 U.S.C. § 641 
provides criminal penalties for "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, pur­
loins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or 
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record . . .  or 
thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency 
thereof," and "[w]hoever receives, conceals, or retains the same 
with intent to convert it to his use or gain knowing it to have been 
embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted." Government employ­
ees have been convicted under this provision for unauthorized pho­
tocopying and dissemination of confidential documents.40 18 
U.S.C. § 2071 provides criminal penalties for anyone who "willfully 
and unlawfully conceals, removes . . .  or, with intent to do so takes 
and carries away any record . . .  paper, document, or other thing, 
filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the 
United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public 
officer of the United States . . . .  " On their face, these statutes ap­
pear to prohibit unauthorized removal of confidential records from 
a federal court, although the few courts that have interpreted 
section 2071 have limited its application to mutilation, destruc­
tion, or permanent removal of documents, while section 641 
has broader applications.41 Both of these statutes are explicitly 
40. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a file 
clerk's unauthorized photocopying of confidential documents in FBI office constituted a vio­
lation of the statute) ("A duplicate copy is a record for purposes of the statute, and duplicate 
copies belonging to the government were stolen."); see also United States v. McAusland, 979 
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1003 (1993) (statute not unconstitutionally 
vague when applied to unauthorized disclosure of government bid information); United 
States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985) (convicting defendant under § 641 for acquiring 
carbon papers used in typing secret grand jury transcripts and passing the information con­
tained therein to grand jury targets, even though the government did not lose possession of 
informational property); United States v. Jones, 677 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding 
statute not unconstitutionally vague when applied to unauthorized sale of nonpublic informa­
tion that the defendant overheard concerning a federal criminal investigation). Several cases 
have reserved for future decision the issue of whether § 641 would be constitutional in a 
"Pentagon Papers scenario" where information is leaked to a newspaper for public consump­
tion. See Jeter 775 F.2d at 682; Jones, 677 F. Supp. at 242 n.5. But see United States v. Mori­
son, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060-62, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 1988) (military intelligence employee convicted 
under § 641 for unauthorized transmittal of satellite-secured photographs to a British period­
ical, even though the defendant contended that he did not steal the photographs for private 
use but in order to give them to the press for public dissemination and information). For a 
criticism of the government's use of § 641 in the Pentagon Papers case, see generally Melville 
B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ell­
sberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311, 315-23 (1974). Even if § 641 were found to be constitution­
ally overbroad when used to criminally prosecute persons who gratuitously "leak" 
information or even documents to the press, such leaks are distinguishable from the situation 
in which a former government employee receives royalties from a book that he himself wrote 
based on documents that were removed from his government employer's files without 
authorization. 
41. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 168 F. 198 (8th Cir. 1909) (holding that § 2071 did 
not apply to defendant's hand copying from a roll of Indian tribe members that was kept in a 
government office vault); United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 919-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(examining the legislative history and "previous application" of § 2071 and concluding that it 
would only apply to permanent mutilation, destruction, or removal of documents). The Ian-
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cited at the beginning of the Code of Conduct for Judicial 
Employees.42 
First Amendment concerns would complicate, although proba­
bly not prevent, prosecution of a clerk who removed documents 
from the Court's files and gave them to the press or to a person 
writing about the Court. Admittedly, it would be difficult to pre­
vent the publication by a newspaper or author of documents ob­
tained in violation of these statutes,43 but limitations on prior 
restraint do not necessarily bar prosecution of the perpetrator. The 
most significant obstacle to such a prosecution is that the perpetra­
tor cannot be identified if the recipient of the purloined documents 
is permitted to refuse to disclose his sources. 
The feasibility of prosecution or prior restraint, however, is not 
the point when it comes to evaluating whether conduct is legal and 
ethical, particularly when one or more perpetrators are now mem­
bers of the bar entrusted with, among other things, confidential 
documents from their clients. It makes matters worse if the person 
who uses purloined documents in a book is a federal prosecutor 
who could now be entrusted with yet more confidential information 
by the United States government. While journalists sometimes re­
fuse to reveal their sources, prosecutors are charged with upholding 
the law, not with concealing possible violations of the law.44 
D .  Arguments and Responses 
Both in television and radio interviews following publication 
of Closed Chambers45 and in a letter to the Wall Street 
guage of § 2071, however, like § 641, does not explicitly limit the statute's reach to original 
documents, and the construction of the statute in Rosner acknowledged that "legislative his­
tory is almost wholly lacking." See 352 F. Supp. at 919. The Rosner court furthermore 
pointed out that had the defendants in that case been indicted under § 641, the government's 
reasoning with respect to unauthorized photocopying of government records "would [have 
been] fully applicable." See 352 F. Supp. at 922; see also supra note 40 (case law applying 
§ 641 to copies of government documents as well as originals). Some of the correspondence 
removed from the Supreme Court and relied upon in Closed Chambers could have been 
original copies, in which case both § 641 and § 2071 would apply. There is simply no way of 
knowing unless Lazarus opens his files for inspection. 
42. CooE oF CoNDucr FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(A). 
43. See New York Ttmes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that prior 
restraint on newspaper's publication of excerpts of confidential Pentagon papers concerning 
the conduct of the Vietnam War required the government to meet a heavy burden of showing 
justification, and that the government had not met that burden). See also supra note 40 
(discussing unresolved constitutional issues that would arise in a prosecution of the 
perpetrator). 
44. The different ethical standards observed by lawyers and journalists are discussed infra 
in the text accompanying notes 126-36. 
45. See, e.g., The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1998) (interview with 
Edward Lazarus by Katie Courie); CBS News, The Osgood File (television broadcast, June 
15, 1998) (interview with Edward Lazarus by Charles Osgood); McNeil-Lehrer Productions, 
The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, June 15, 1998) (dialogue between 
David Gergen and Edward Lazarus). 
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Journal, 46 Lazarus has defended himself against the charge that he 
breached a confidential relationship that he had with the Justices of 
the Supreme Court. He has made the following arguments in de­
fense of Closed Chambers. After each, a response follows. 
1. Argument: Closed Chambers Merely "Reconstructs" 
Information Learned in Confidential Communications. 47 
Lazarus stands on weak ground when he claims that he may re­
veal a confidence that he reconstructed from other unnamed 
sources. First, Lazarus's knowledge of confidential information 
makes the act of reconstruction easy and thus the distinction be­
tween reconstruction and direct revelation mostly academic. Sec­
ond, Lazarus's unwillingness to disclose the sources from which he 
"reconstructed" makes his claim that he used a source other than 
himself impossible to verify. Finally, such a distinction has little 
grounding in the law governing confidential communications. The 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, specifi­
cally points out that a lawyer's ethical obligation to keep the confi­
dences of a client "exists without regard to the nature or source of 
information or the fact that others share the knowledge."48 The 
Comment to ABA Model Rule 1.6 likewise states that the confiden­
tiality rule applies to "all information relating to the representation, 
whatever its source."49 Allowing a lawyer to reveal his client's con­
fidences by using his inside knowledge to squeeze the same infor­
mation from other sources would eviscerate the lawyer-client 
relationship. The relationship between Justices and their clerks 
would be similarly destroyed if clerks could so easily circumvent 
their obligation to keep confidences.50 
46. Edward Lazarus, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A19. 
47. See p. xi ("I have reconstructed what I knew and supplemented that knowledge 
through primary sources (either publicly available or provided by others) and dozens of 
interviews conducted over the last five years."); see also Collins & Skover, Interview with 
Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I'm quite explicit in my book that I think that being a former clerk 
helped my book in any number of ways; that maybe people were more likely to talk to me, I 
think it's quite possible. But, even more than that, I knew how to read the paper trail; I knew 
what questions to ask . . . .  "). 
48. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBILITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE] E C  4-4 
(amended 1989). 
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RuLES] Rule 1.6 
cmt. 5 (1993). 
50. By analogy, federal insider trading laws do not permit a person with inside informa­
tion about a company to trade in the company's securities simply because the trader "recon­
structed" the information from other nonpublic sources besides herself, particularly if these 
sources were themselves breaching a duty to the issuer or its security holders. See Dirks v. 
SE C, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that a tippee can be liable for trading on material 
nonpublic information while knowing that his tipper breached a duty by disclosing the infor­
mation to him). 
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2. Argument: The Confidentiality Provisions of the Code of 
Conduct Do Not Apply to Former Clerks. 
The Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Clerks, Canon 3, pro­
vides that "a law clerk should never disclose to any person any con­
fidential information received in the course of the law clerk's 
duties, nor should the law clerk employ such information for per­
sonal gain." Presumably the word "never" in Canon 3 means what 
it says, and it would defeat the Code's purpose to argue that a law 
clerk is no longer bound by these Canons and may reveal confiden­
tial information after his clerkship ends. 
Lazarus, however, in his comments to Time,51 in a letter to The 
Wall Street Journal, 52 and in an editorial in The Washington Post, 53 
has stated that the Code of Conduct no longer applies to him. To 
prove this point, he seizes upon its last provision: 
Effective Date of Compliance A person to whom this Code becomes 
applicable shall comply with it immediately upon commencement of 
his or her clerkship and throughout such clerkship. Violations of the 
Code by a law clerk may be disciplined by his or her appointing Jus­
tice, including dismissaJ.54 
Lazarus argues that the confidentiality provisions in Canon 2 and 
Canon 3, like other provisions of the Code, therefore "appl[y] to 
clerks only during their service at the court (not to former clerks 
who routinely talk to the press). This is why the explicit penalty for 
Code violations is limited to dismissal as a clerk."55 Lazarus, how­
ever, fails to name a single former Supreme Court clerk (besides 
himself) "who routinely talk[s] to the press" about the Court's con­
fidences. Furthermore, his attempt to turn the "Effective Date of 
Compliance" clause into a release from the Code's confidentiality 
provisions fails. 
First, the mere fact that a clerk can no longer be fired by a Jus­
tice does not mean that the clerk is permitted to violate his ethical 
obligation of confidentiality to the Court. The plain purpose of the 
"Effective Date of Compliance" provision in the Code is to estab­
lish when and how the Court will discipline a clerk for a violation, 
not to relieve clerks of their duty to keep confidences as soon as 
51. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 31 ("Lazarus argues [the confidentiality provision of the 
Code] applies only when a clerk is actually employed by the Justice."). 
52. Lazarus, supra note 46, at A19 (responding to Painter). 
53. Lazarus, supra note 18, at A19 ("[T]he Law Clerk Code of Conduct, including its 
confidentiality provision, applies only to clerks during their time at the court (to protect 
deliberation on pending and impending cases) and has no bearing on the propriety of a for­
mer clerk writing a book."). 
54. CooE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 6, quoted in Lazarus, supra note 18, at A19, 
and Lazarus, supra note 46, at A19. 
55. Lazarus, supra note 46, at A19. Professor Chemerinsky makes a similar argument. 
See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 107. 
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they move on to a new job. By analogy, a lawyer has an obligation 
to keep the confidences of his clients, and ending a lawyer-client 
relationship or even moving to another jurisdiction hardly permits 
the lawyer to disclose those confidences.56 Even if the lawyer can 
no longer be punished for breach of professional conduct rules in 
the former jurisdiction, the second jurisdiction may punish the 
breach. More importantly, the lawyer has acted unethically. In like 
manner, the Court's relinquishment of the power to discipline a 
clerk at the conclusion of his clerkship does not automatically re­
lease the clerk from all ethical obligations he might otherwise have 
to the Court. 
Second, the "Effective Date of Compliance" provision affirma­
tively states when a clerk must comply with the Code in its entirety, 
including provisions such as the one (immediately above it on the 
same page) stating that a clerk should not seek political office.57 
Nowhere does the Code indicate when a clerk's obligation to obey 
the Code shall cease. Common sense suggests that many of the 
Code's obligations (such as not to run for political office) do expire 
with the clerkship. Common sense also tells us, however, that a 
confidential relationship, whether it be lawyer-client, doctor-pa­
tient, priest-penitent, or any other, would not exist if confidences 
could be breached as soon as the relationship is over. Lazarus's 
construction of the Code simply defies logic. 
Finally, construing the "Effective Date of Compliance" provi­
sion as a release of the confidentiality obligation upon termination 
of a clerkship creates a glaring conflict with the language of unlim­
ited duration (the word "never") that is used in Canon 3 to state 
when a clerk may disclose the Court's confidences. Indeed, the 
56. See MooEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 21 ("The duty of confidentiality 
continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."). The Justice-clerk relation­
ship is in many ways similar to the relationship of a client and lawyer, particularly that of a 
government official and the government lawyer he consults in order to carry out the duties of 
public office. The Justice has the power to hire and fire the clerk, much as the client has the 
power to hire and fire the lawyer. The Justice relies on the clerk for advice about the law, 
much as the client relies on the lawyer for advice. The clerk must avoid political or other 
obligations which conflict \vith the clerk's duties to the Justice, much as the lawyer must 
avoid representing clients with conflicting interests. Finally, and most importantly for the 
present analysis, the Justice expects the law clerk not to disclose her confidences without her 
permission, much as the client expects her lawyer to keep her confidences. The Justice and 
client both engage in free and frank discussion when seeking advice from the law clerk and 
lawyer respectively because this duty of confidentiality protects what they say from being 
disclosed \vithout their permission. There are some differences between the two relation­
ships, the most important being that the clerk is not the legal representative of the Justice as 
the lawyer is the legal representative of the client. The clerk thus does not enter appear­
ances, take depositions, file pleadings, or carry out other representative functions on behalf 
of the Justice. These differences have little bearing, however, on the value of confidentiality 
to the relationship, and insofar as the duty of confidentiality and its underlying rationale are 
concerned, the analogy between the Justice-clerk and client-lawyer relationships is an apt 
one. 
57. See CooE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 6. 
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Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees promulgated by the Judi­
cial Conference of the United States, and applicable to every fed­
eral law clerk outside the Supreme Court, makes this point even 
more explicit: "A former judicial employee should observe the 
same restrictions on disclosure of confidential information that ap­
ply to a current judicial employee. "58 Lazarus apparently is arguing 
that if a Court of Appeals clerk later clerks for the Supreme Court, 
the clerk may, as soon as his clerkship is over, publicly discuss de­
tails of how the Justices decided a case and need only keep the con­
fidences of the judges who decided the case below. Lazarus is too 
intelligent actually to believe an argument so absurd. 
3. Argument: There Is No Basis for the Suspicion That Closed 
Chambers Uses Documents That Were Illegally Removed 
from the Supreme Court Building. 59 
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct prohibits removal by a clerk of 
documents from the Court,60 and the United States Code prohibits 
unauthorized removal and use of records from a federal court. 61 
There is no conclusive proof that the nonpublic documents used in 
Closed Chambers were removed from the courthouse without au­
thorization. Lazarus's repeated reliance on such documents, how­
ever, coupled with his refusal to disclose their source, warrants 
serious concern. This refusal makes it difficult to confirm or dispel 
the suspicion of misuse, and if documents were removed from the 
Court without authorization, we cannot tell who the culprit was. 
Nonetheless, even if Lazarus did not personally take the Chief 
Justice's draft opinion in Webster and related correspondence out of 
the courthouse, it is still important to determine how he got them. 
A lawyer should not use illegally purloined material in writing a 
book any more than in preparing a case,62 and now that he is a 
federal prosecutor, Lazarus should have taken care to make certain 
that nobody violated the Code of Conduct or any provision of the 
federal criminal code by providing him with documents. The au­
thor of this review has sought assurance from Lazarus that none of 
the nonpublic documents discussed in Closed Chambers was re-
58. CoDE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D). 
59. See Lazarus, supra note 46, at Al9 (calling "outrageous and false" the charge that he 
may have misused government documents). 
60. See CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 3. 
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); supra text accompanying notes 
40-44. Although the few courts that have interpreted § 2071 have held that it only applies to 
originals of documents, § 641 has repeatedly been applied to copies. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
62. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 4.4 (stating that an attorney shall not "use 
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of [another] person"); Rule 4.4 
cmt. ("It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on 
methods of obtaining evidence from third persons."). 
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moved from the Supreme Court without authorization, but Lazarus 
has given no such assurance and, in particular, refuses to discuss 
where he examined the draft opinions and correspondence in Web­
ster. 63 Lazarus claims that he did not see these documents when he 
clerked for the Court the year Webster was decided,64 but he will 
not disclose who apparently gave him access to these documents 
years later.65 His willingness to discuss the secrets of the Court 
stands in stark contrast to his reticence about his sources. 
E. Anonymity, .Verifiability, and Credibility 
Although not the principal focus of this review, the substantive 
merit of Closed Chambers is worthy of some discussion, at least in­
sofar as it benefited or suffered from use of confidential communi­
cations. From the standpoint of the book's quality alone, were the 
breaches of trust that went into it worthwhile? 
The answer appears to be "no." Apart from the Chief Justice's 
draft opinion and the memoranda he exchanged with other con­
servative Justices in Webster (pp. 466-69), and perhaps some of the 
memoranda exchanged among the Justices in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey (pp. 484-86) and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (pp. 
309-12), Lazarus has uncovered little new documentary material.66 
The nonpublic documents that Lazarus does disclose for the· first 
time have little value, because he selectively quotes and para­
phrases without reprinting them in an appendix or completely dis­
closing when they were written, to whom they were circulated, and 
the complete subject matter discussed therein. For scholars of the 
Court, Lazarus's documentary disclosure will be paltry and 
unilluminating. 67 
Lazarus has, however, disclosed, or at least alleged, a significant 
amount of information that might embarrass the Justices. The book 
tells us that Justice Stevens was away in Florida so often that he 
63. See Telephone Interview with Edward Lazarus (Apr. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Telephone 
Interview with Lazarus]. 
64. See id.; Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19. 
65. See Telephone Interview with Lazarus, supra note 63. 
66. Justice Brennan's draft opinions in Patterson y. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989), are discussed, pp. 310-24, but presumably are also included in Justice Brennan's pub­
licly available papers. A portion of Justice Kennedy's correspondence with other Justices 
about Patterson, however, may not be publicly available, although it is discussed in Closed 
Chambers. See Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski to Edward Lazarus, supra note 29. Justice 
Stevens's draft opinion in Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1988), and the correspondence 
among the Justices about the case are discussed, pp. 62-69, but, as Lazarus points out in a 
footnote, "the record in Tompkins is buried in Marshall's papers," p. 68. Some of the memo­
randa written by Justice Kennedy on this case and discussed in Closed Chambers may not be 
publicly available. See Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski to Edward Lazarus, supra note 29. 
67. See Tushnet, supra note 7 ("Lazarus provides rather little evidence to support the 
book's most publicized 'revelations."'). 
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"became the FedEx Justice" (p. 279), that Justice Marshall watched 
soap operas in his office (p. 278), and that Justice Kennedy, while 
driving, listened to audiotaped briefings of cases prepared by his 
clerks (p. 394). Many of these tales have been told before, some in 
print68 and some by word of mouth. Whether true or false, such 
gossip is of relatively little value to our understanding of the Court, 
and most of it is unworthy of inclusion in a book that aspires to 
scholarly importance. 
Perhaps more important, several Justices, most notably Justices 
Marshall, Thomas, Kennedy, and O ' Connor, are portrayed 
throughout Closed Chambers as being heavily influenced by clerks 
who frame their ideas and even tell them how to vote. A "fre­
quently disengaged" Marshall, for example, "cast his vote and that 
was about all" as "with a minimum of guidance his clerks did the 
work" (p. 278). His successor, Justice Thomas, "looked uninter­
ested, often not bothering to remove the rubber band from his stack 
of briefs," and took both his ideas and a "hand-me-down" law clerk 
from Justice Scalia (p. 457). Conservative clerks secured Justice 
Kennedy's vote against stays of execution by getting him to vote 
early (p. 270), and a "hypocritical" Justice O'Connor was easily in­
fluenced by her clerks in crucial decisions (pp. 299, 391-94). Once 
again, substantiation of these claims is lacking because Lazarus 
does not disclose from whence this information came. 
Finally, there is the infamous conservative clerks' "cabal,'' 
which, Lazarus alleges, conspired to rig crucial votes - although he 
fails to specify how. He attributes statements, often in quotation 
marks, to other clerks by name, but does not cite a source. 69 He 
sometimes does not even explain whether an attributed statement 
was made in a conversation, a memo, or an e-mail.70 The words 
used and their context could have been as he reports or could have 
been different; we simply have no way of knowing. In many cases, 
statements attributed to one clerk could have been made by an­
other or could have been made up by somebody along the way.11 
The fact that Lazarus refuses to reveal his sources compounds the 
problem with his use of multiple hearsay. The fact that most other 
former clerks strictly observe their obligation to keep confidences 
68. As Lazarus acknowledges, the stories about Justice Marshall had been published 
before. See p. 278 (citing Terry Eastland, While Justice Sleeps, NATL. REv., Apr. 21, 1989, at 
24). Lazarus merely adds that "[Marshall's] clerks could fume and accuse the cabal of talking 
to journalists out of school, but they could not deny." P. 278. 
69. See, e.g., p. 265 (quoting an e-mail by Andrew McBride from "mid-September" 1988). 
70. See, e.g., p. 269 (quoting exhortation to increase the number of executions in death 
penalty cases attributed to an alleged cabal member). 
71. For example, the colloquy alleged to have taken place between Paul Cappuccio and 
Harry Litman in Justice Kennedy's chambers (pp. 394-95) may have happened the way 
Lazarus says it did, may have happened differently, or may not have happened at all. See 
supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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also makes it exceedingly difficult for anyone to say that what Laza­
rus reports isn't so.72 
In sum, many of Lazarus's revelations are supported by little 
more than his representations about documents he will not allow 
his readers to see and interviews with persons, undoubtedly former 
clerks, whose names he will not reveal. With respect to the Chief 
Justice's draft opinion and Justice Kennedy's correspondence in 
Webster, for example, he is in effect saying to his readers, "Trust 
me." After hearing Lazarus's arguments around his duty to keep 
the confidences of the Justices,73 not every reader will want to take 
this leap of faith. 
F. Lazarus's Lost Perspective 
Closed Chambers also suffers from the loss of perspective that 
came with Lazarus's decision, perhaps at the urging of his publisher, 
to write a book centered on his clerkship rather than on the Court 
itself. Although most of the book is organized topically and chron­
ologically, Lazarus persistently breaks from the sequence to discuss 
his clerkship and to remind the reader that he was an insider.74 
Lazarus also believes that he is disclosing a significant amount of 
important new information about the Court, and points to the con­
troversy surrounding his book as proof of this fact,75 but he fails to 
understand that disclosure by a former clerk of any confidential in­
formation, however unimportant, will attract attention simply be­
cause the disclosure itself is ethically controversial. 
Finally, Lazarus lacks perspective because he was a participant 
in many of the events he describes, ranging from the battle over the 
Bork nomination76 to the cases decided during his clerkship. 
Lazarus's participation, however, was that of a clerk, not a Justice, 
and he is handicapped by his obsession with disputes among 
72. Clerks whom Lazarus casts in an unfavorable light and other clerks who witnessed 
what happened cannot answer his claims without themselves breaching confidences in viola­
tion of the Code of Conduct. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-65. 
74. Lazarus's interview with Justice Blackmun and the early days of his clerkship are 
discussed, pp. 21-46, before a lengthy historical expose on the death penalty that begins with 
Scottsboro and ends with a chapter on the Burger Court entitled "Backlash," pp. 77-118. Tue 
book picks up again in 1988 in a chapter entitled "The Death Watch" which begins with the 
words, "When I started clerking for Justice Blackmun in July 1988 . . . .  " P. 119. 
75. Lazarus, supra note 3 (responding to on-line book reviews) ("That so many people 
. . . react so defensively, almost nonsensically to my book only convinces me that I have 
succeeded in touching disturbing truths that no one feels comfortable discussing openly and 
honestly. That is satisfying indeed."). 
76. See p. 247 ("During the [Senate] hearings, my [Ninth Circuit] co-clerks and I had 
spent more than a few off-hours thinking up and funneling to friends on the Senate commit­
tee staff questions that would expose the weaknesses and contradictions in Bork's 
positions."). 
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clerks.77 His account, although intriguing when he examines the 
Justices' deliberations in the years prior to his clerkship, deterio­
rates markedly when he turns to the Court in the late 1980s and 
1990s. His discussion of these years would have been more in­
sightful if he had continued to focus on communications among the 
Justices, which abound in publicly available papers, and had 
avoided more trivial communications between Justices and clerks, 
and particularly among the clerks themselves. 
G. Lazarus's Motive 
Why does Lazarus breach his own confidences with Justice 
Blackmun, repeat statements made by clerks who are also breach­
ing confidences, and quote from confidential documents, particu­
larly when Closed Chambers would have been just as strong a book, 
and probably a stronger book, if he had not done so? Unfortu­
nately, promotional objectives, at least in the mind of Lazarus's 
publisher, appear to have dominated concerns about both ethics 
and editorial quality. The front of the book's cover boldly adver­
tises that Lazarus is a "Former Supreme Court Clerk," while the 
back cover crows, "A Rare Clerk's-Eye View of the Supreme 
Court." The review copy boasted that "[f]or the first time ever, a 
former Supreme Court clerk reveals what really goes on at the 
world's most powerful legal institution" and that "[n]ever before 
has a Supreme Court clerk told the true story of how the Court 
decides cases." The inside-cover synopsis of the published version 
promises that Lazarus will "guide[ ] the reader through the Court's 
inner sanctum, explaining as only an eyewitness can the collisions of 
law, politics, and personality." All this makes it appear that sales 
and hype got the better of good judgment. For a book that is so 
well written, by an author of such promise,78 this is tragic. 
Unfortunately, the promotion effort may not end there. 
Lazarus has already given television and radio interviews about 
Closed Chambers, 79 and according to the inside front cover of the 
review copy, he was commissioned by Warner Brothers to write a 
screenplay about the Court. In a subsequent interview Lazarus 
pointed out that his screenplay was commissioned in 1991 and is 
77. The most outlandish revelation in Closed Chambers does not pertain to any specific 
case before the Court, but to a fight between two clerks, a liberal and a conservative, that 
ended when both fell into the fountain in the Court's courtyard. P. 419. While amusing, this 
anecdote only underscores the immaturity of at least some of the Court's clerks, not their 
level of influence over the more serious issues that were before the Justices. 
78. Lazarus's first book, BLACK Hiu.s/WHTIE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE 
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991), was favorably reviewed in several publica­
tions, including the Harvard Law Review. See, e.g., Recent Publications, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
810, 811 (1993) (book notice). 
79. See supra note 45 (citing radio and television interviews with Lazarus). 
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fictional.80 Nonetheless, the prospect of a former Supreme Court 
clerk selling to Hollywood a story about the Court and then writing 
a book disclosing the confidences of the Justices is probably not 
what the Justices contemplated when they first invited recent law 
graduates into their chambers over a century ago. 
II. CLERKS AND CONFIDENCES 
A. The Relationship Between Judges and Law Clerks 
Chief Judge Horace Gray of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court in 1875 became the first judge to employ law clerks, most 
of whom were recent graduates of the Harvard Law School where 
his brother John Chipman Gray was a professor.81 When Justice 
Gray was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1882, 
he brought his clerk to Washington.82 The other Justices eventually 
followed suit, and by 1939 all were employing clerks. 83 For years, a 
clerk's obligation to keep the confidences of the Court was an un­
written rule, and a foundation of the Justice-clerk relationship.84 
80. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19. 
81. See J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or For Worse? 54 BROOK. L. REv. 
321, 322 (1988); see also JOHN OAKLEY & ROBERT s. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 10 (1980); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 
V AND. L. REv. 1125, 1129-30 (1973); Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme 
Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REv. 299, 301 (1961). 
82. See Mahoney, supra note 81, at 322-23. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 325. David Garrow, in his review of CLOSED CHAMBERS, recounts past 
incidents of public disclosures by former Supreme Court law clerks and concludes that Laza­
rus's conduct is entirely in keeping with this "under-appreciated tradition." See David J. 
Garrow, "The Lowest Form of Animal Life"? Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court 
History, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 855, 893-94 (1999) (book review). Garrow recites a long list of 
illustrious former clerks, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Harvard Law 
School Dean James Landis, who presumably breached confidences, and even goes so far as to 
suggest that "the first true precursor to Lazarus among former clerks was one of Justice 
Gray's own early appointees, Samuel Williston." Id. at 860. A careful review of Garrow's 
examples, however, reveals that almost all of these former clerks publicly discussed or wrote 
about their clerkships 30 to 60 years after their clerkships ended and after the Justices to 
whom they owed the duty to keep confidences were dead, along with most if not all of their 
colleagues on the Court. These include Samuel Williston, see id. at 860, who clerked for 
Justice Horace Gray in October Term 1888 and then wrote about his clerkship 52 years later 
in a 1940 autobiography (Justice Gray died in 1902); Dean Acheson, see id. at 860-81, who 
clerked for Justice Louis D. Brandies in October Terms 1919 and 1920 and then wrote about 
his clerkship 45 years later in a 1965 autobiography (Justice Brandies died in 1941); C. Dick­
erson Williams, see id. at 861-62, who clerked for Justice William Howard Taft in October 
Term 1924 and then wrote about his clerkship 65 years later in a 1989 article (Justice Taft died 
in 1930); Alfred McCormack, see id. at 862, who clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in 
October Term 1925 and then told a few stories from his clerkship 21 years later in a 1946 law 
review article (Justice Stone died that same year); and James M. Landis, see id. at 862-63, who 
clerked for Justice Brandeis in October Term 1925 and then told some humorous anecdotes 
from his clerkship 32 years later in a 1957 public talk. Although the duty to keep confidences 
arguably survives the death of the Justices to whom that duty is owed, see infra text accompa­
nying notes 140-41, it is understandable that some former clerks have taken a different view. 
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Clerks have usually been careful about preserving confidentiality, 
but the Justices have on occasion had to remind them of its impor­
tance, as Justice Stone did in a memorandum to his clerks in the 
1930s: 
Washington is infested with a cheap class of newspaper hangers-on 
who at times have cultivated the law clerks of the justices and picked 
up scraps of conversation or remarks which are harmless enough in 
themselves, but which, when distorted and published, tend to discredit 
the Court or its member[s] in public estimation. Much of this has 
been the result of idle gossip which goes on among the law clerks 
themselves, and when it is ultimately published, after being several 
times repeated, bears little resemblance to its original form.85 
Justice Stone went on to say that he believed his clerks were mature 
enough "to appreciate this fact and refrain from commenting to 
outsiders about the observations which they gain from the intimate 
association into which they have been invited. "86 
B. The Brethren 
Few clerks openly admit having breached the confidences of 
their Justices.87 In 1979, however, Bob Woodward and Scott Arm­
strong compiled a book from interviews with former Supreme 
Court clerks and from documents delivered to them by some of 
These examples are clearly distinguishable from the conduct of Lazarus and his sources, 
whose disclosures were published only nine years after their clerkships ended and while al­
most all of the Justices for whom they had clerked were still alive. 
Furthermore, only one of Garrow's examples involves what was arguably unauthorized 
use of confidential documents from Supreme Court files. John D. Fassett, who clerked for 
Justice Stanley Reed in October Term 1953, gave a 1966 speech to "the Benchers," a group of 
Connecticut lawyers and judges about Justice Reed's position on Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion. See Garrow, supra, at 868 (citing John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. Board 
of Education, 1986 SUP. CT. HIST. SoCY. Y.B. 48, 48 (publishing the text of Fassett's 1966 
speech)). In the speech, Fassett quoted internal Court memoranda from a folder marked 
"segregation" that Fassett had removed from the Court without asking permission from Jus­
tice Reed. Fassett, however, specifically asked his audience to advise him on when he should 
make these details public, to respect his confidence, and not to publicly discuss the content of 
the speech in the meantime. Fassett, supra, at 49. Fassett's conduct, although not necessarily 
commendable, is distinguishable in several respects from the apparent conduct of sources 
used for CLOSED CHAMBERS. Frrst, in 1953 there was no express prohibition on removal of 
documents from the Court similar to that in the Code of Conduct. Code of Conduct, supra 
note 11, canon 3C. Second, Fassett recognized the ethical concerns raised by his revelations, 
asked his audience to keep his remarks confidential, and postponed publication of the speech 
until 20 years after it was delivered, and six years after the death of Justice Reed in 1980. 
85. George Gold, Loose Tongues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 28 (quoting a memorandum 
from Justice Stone to his law clerks filed in Box 48 of Stone's papers in the Library of 
Congress). 
86. Id. 
87. Even though the book jacket and review copy of Closed Chambers tout the book as 
an insider expose, see supra text accompanying note 77, Lazarus has gone to great lengths to 
argue that he has not breached the Court's confidences. See arguments listed supra Section 
I.D. 
May 1999] Clerk Confidentiality 1455 
those clerks.88 Woodward and Armstrong were journalists, not law­
yers, and anticipating that the conduct of their sources would come 
under attack, refused to reveal their names.89 
Reaction was swift and much of it harsh. Anthony Lewis wrote 
that The Brethren was "character assassination" amounting to "hit 
and run journalism," and that "significant factual errors" raised 
questions about whether the authors knew what they were talking 
about.90 A review by John Leonard in the New York Times pointed 
out that the book "read[ s] everybody's mind without identifying a 
single source."91 Commentators, liberal and conservative alike, in­
cluding Gerald Gunther, James Kilpatrick, George Will, and Floyd 
Abrams, were even more critical of the former clerks who had 
breached confidences and apparently saw themselves as being at 
the center of the Court's work.92 These condemnations, however, 
did not discourage some former Clerks from talking yet again, and 
in 1983 Bernard Schwartz published Superchief,93 an account of the 
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren which also drew on informa­
tion from former clerks, although less so than The Brethren. After 
publication of these books, it is not surprising that, when the Court 
decided to promulgate a written Code of Conduct for its clerks in 
1989, the longstanding confidentiality rule was embodied in Canons 
2 and 3 of the new Code.94 
C. Previous Accounts by Former Clerks 
In their writings, as well as spoken words, former clerks have 
generally been careful in what they say about the Court. One de­
parture from this tradition was a 1987 interview with the Harvard 
Law Review in which a former Frankfurter clerk, Philip Elman, dis­
closed conversations he had with Justice Frankfurter about Brown 
88. See WoomvARD & ARMsTRONG, supra note 2. 
89. See id. at 3-4. 
90. See Alexander Wohl, Those Who Do Not Remember the Past . . .  Closed Chambers -
An Eerie Echo Eighteen Years After The Brethren, JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAw (May 1998) 
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/pamay98.htm> (quoting a review by Anthony Lewis in 
the New York Review of Books). 
91. Id. (quoting a review by John Leonard in The New York Times). 
92. See id. ("When I clerked for the Supreme Court I felt it was a damned confidential 
job. Both the skill of Woodward and Armstrong and the insensitivity of the law clerks show a 
significant and depressing change of standards." (quoting Gerald Gunther commenting to 
Macleans)); id. ("If there be scandal in The Brethren, . . .  this is it. Clerks are retained by 
members of the Court under conditions of absolute confidence . . . .  Many of them, it seems 
apparent, learned much law but nothing of honor." (quoting James Kilpatrick, reviewing the 
book for the National Review)); id. ("Many clerks betrayed not merely their institution, but 
also standards of common decency." (quoting George Will, writing in Newsweek)); id. 
("[T]he law clerks now think that they run the place - or that they should." (quoting Floyd 
Abrams, writing for Fortune)). 
93. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF (1983). 
94. See CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canons 2 & 3. 
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v. Board of Education and other cases that were before the Court in 
the 1950s.95 These conversations, however, took place after 
Elman's clerkship, and his revelations were controversial not be­
cause the conversations were confidential, but because they took 
place while Elm.an was filing amicus briefs on behalf of the Solicitor 
General's office in these very same cases. The longstanding prohi­
bition on ex parte contacts suggested that these conversations never 
should have occurred in the first place.96 
Other former clerks have written books about the Court. These 
include J. Harvie Wilkinson, now Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, who in 1974 wrote a book about his clerkship for 
Justice Powell,97 but was careful to respect the Court's confi­
dences.98 Professor John Jeffries, another former Powell clerk, in 
1994 also wrote a book about Justice Powell, who cooperated by 
giving Jeffries access to his files and his memories.99 Jeffries also 
spoke with nine of Justice Powell's colleagues on the Court.10° 
Neither of these authors concealed the identity of their sources or 
disclosed confidential memoranda or draft opinions without author­
ization. In 1998, Professor Dennis Hutchinson, a former clerk for 
Justice Byron White, published an unauthorized biography of Jus­
tice White.101 The book relies on interviews with White's former 
95. See The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 
1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HAR.v. L. REv. 817 (1987) (interview by Norman Silber 
with Philip Elman). 
96. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 3 (1908) ("A lawyer should not com­
municate or argue privately with the Judge as to the merits of a pending cause . . • .  "); MODEL 
CODE, supra note 48, DR 7-110 (prohibiting ex parte contacts); MoDEL RuLES, supra note 
48, Rule 3.5(b) (same). 
97. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE (1974). 
98. See id. at xiii ("Much of what goes on within the Supreme Court must be kept in 
confidence if the spirit of frank and informal exchange there is to continue to prevail. The 
need for such confidence in the Court's deliberations will always be important, and I have 
tried in every instance to respect it.") 
99. See JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JuSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. ix (1994) ("Many people 
helped make this book possible. The greatest debt is owed to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who 
generously gave me access to his files and his memories without attempting to control what I 
wrote."). 
100. See id. ("Other than Justices William 0. Douglas and Potter Stewart, both of whom 
died before this project began, I have spoken with all of Powell's colleagues on the Supreme 
Court. They include Chief Justices William H. Rehnquist and Warren E. Burger and Associ­
ate Justices William J. Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John 
Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Antonin Scalia.") 
101. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHo ONCE WAs WHIZZER WHITE (1998). 
David Garrow claims that "both Lazarus and Hutchinson have used exactly the same meth­
ods to make almost exactly the same sorts of novel disclosures." Garrow, supra note 84, at 
893. Garrow also suggests that Hutchinson may have been offered copies of documents that 
other former clerks retained after their clerkships. See id. at 892. The first of these state­
ments is simply wrong. Hutchinson wrote about events that occurred outside his clerkship 
year. See Letter from Anthony Kronman to Richard Painter, supra note 9 {"I do think a 
different and more difficult question arises when a former clerk reports confidences pertain­
ing to events that occurred either before or after his or her clerkship year."). Furthermore, 
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clerks, but does not use confidential documents from the Court's 
:files.102 
Other former clerks, including Professors Richard Revesz and 
Pamela Karlan,103 have written law review articles about cases that 
were decided during their Term on the Court, but they have been 
careful not to disclose confidential communications with the Jus­
tices and only to use documents from the public record. Lazarus 
himself in 1994 wrote a four-page law review tribute to Justice 
Blackmun in which private conversations within Blackmun's cham­
bers were disclosed,104 but presumably this was done with Justice 
Blackmun's permission, and the article did not disclose confidential 
communications from the chambers of other Justices. 
D. The Extent and Limits of Confidentiality 
Lazarus goes outside the parameters of ethical conduct by dis­
closing communications made directly to him and to other clerks by 
Justices of the Court, and by using documents that may have been 
illegally removed from the Supreme Court building.105 Although 
some former clerks have written or spoken about confidential com­
munications decades after their clerkships, and generally after the 
Justices to whom they owed the duty to keep confidences were 
dead,1°6 most former clerks who have written about the Court lim­
ited themselves to the public record or that which they were permit­
ted to disclose, and have not cast suspicion on themselves by 
refusing to reveal their sources. 
· 
Nonetheless, there is still some ambiguity, perhaps too much 
ambiguity, in the duty of confidentiality that law clerks owe to their 
Justices. Because dismay over Closed Chambers should be turned 
to more constructive ends than mere condemnation, this review 
there is no evidence whatsoever that Professor Hutchinson was given, or has used, any non­
public Supreme Court documents. Edward Lazarus did use nonpublic documents (dating 
from the year in which he clerked) that somebody apparently removed from the Supreme 
Court building. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29. 
102. Much of the book is about White's life before he joined the Court, including his 
career as a football star. Hutchinson avoids discussing the 1975 Tenn in which he clerked for 
White and focuses on three of the Court's other Terms: 1971, 1981, and 1991. 
103. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme 
Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1068-109 (1988) (discussing erosion of non-majoritarian 
court rules in the death penalty stay process during the 1980s). 
104. See Edward P. Lazarus, The Case of the Severed Arm: A Tribute to Associate Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 725 (1994) (discussing Blackmun's dissent in Green v. 
Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)). This brief article was mostly based on the 
public record, including the Marshall papers, but did include a brief discussion of a post­
conference meeting of Justice Blackmon with his clerks. See id. at 727�28. 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29. 
106. See Garrow, supra note 84, at 860-75; supra note 84 (discussing some of Garrow's 
examples). 
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seeks to begin a dialogue on the parameters of this duty. Interest­
ing questions abound. 
1. Communications by Law Clerks 
May a clerk disclose his own side of a communication with a 
Justice so long as he does not disclose what the Justice said or did in 
response? Once a confidential relationship is shown to exist, as it 
clearly does exist between a Justice and her clerks, the zone of con­
fidentiality is defined by whether the parties to that relationship 
would reasonably expect a communication to be kept confiden­
tial.107 Most communications from a law clerk to a Justice fall 
within the ambit of communications for which confidentiality is 
expected. 
Draft opinions and bench memoranda prepared by clerks are 
usually kept confidential, sometimes even from the chambers of 
other Justices.108 Draft opinions by definition contain the ideas of 
one or more Justices, and bench memoranda reveal what topics a 
Justice has asked her clerk to research. Public disclosure of draft 
opinions and bench memoranda would also allow an outsider to re­
construct whether a Justice was influenced by another Justice or by 
a clerk and how. Finally, widespread expectation of confidentiality 
is demonstrated by the fact that the contents of draft opinions and 
bench memoranda are almost never disclosed to outsiders by clerks 
or former clerks, except by those who are unwilling to identify 
themselves. 
With respect to oral communications, a law clerk who discloses 
his own or another clerk's side of a conversation with a Justice, but 
not what the Justice said in response, merely puts some guesswork 
into discerning the Justice's thoughts. Also, the clerk's advice itself 
should be confidential. A lawyer would act unethically if he dis­
closed to outsiders the advice he gave to a client (such advice is also 
107. Most cases defining which communications in a confidential relationship are in fact 
confidential have been decided under the various evidentiary privileges, principally the 
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 121 F3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 
1997) ("'It is vital to a claim of privilege that the communication have been made and main­
tained in confidence'. . . .  The assertor of the privilege must have a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality, either that the information disclosed is intrinsically confidential, or by show­
ing that he had a subjective intent of confidentiality." (quoting United States v. Pipkins, 528 
F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976))), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 731 (1992). The lawyer's duty to keep 
the confidences of a client is, of course, broader than the privilege, and even if communica­
tions between a Justice and her clerk were not privileged at all, the clerk still has an ethical 
duty not to voluntarily disclose confidences. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
108. Lazarus points out, for example, that Chief Justice Rehnquist's draft opinion in Web­
ster was purportedly circulated only to the Court's more conservative Justices. P. 402. It is 
even more common for bench memoranda and similar work product of clerks not to be 
circulated beyond a Justice's chambers. 
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routinely covered by the attorney-client privilege).109 Likewise, the 
words "complete confidentiality" and "loyalty" in Canon 2 of the 
Code of Conduct cannot fairly be construed to permit a clerk to 
divulge to outsiders the nature of the advice he gave to a Justice. 
Finally, the Justices depend on their clerks for advice, making 
frank communication from clerk to Justice even more important 
than frank communication the other way around. Clerks will not 
tell the Justices what they really think if they fear revelation, per­
haps to future clients or employers, of communications overheard 
by other clerks. If such disclosure were allowed, much of the value 
to the Court of clerkships would be lost.110 
2. Communications Between Law Clerks 
Are communications between law clerks covered by the duty to 
keep confidences? Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct refers to 
"highly confidential circulations from the chambers of other Jus­
tices," that the clerk may "never" disclose.111 This language clearly 
implies that confidential relationships exist not only between Jus­
tices and clerks, but also between clerks and persons in each Jus­
tice's chambers, including other clerks. The Code, however, does 
not define which communications from a Justice's chambers are 
confidential and which are not. Once again, this distinction turns 
largely on whether the parties to the relationship, in "this case the 
sender and recipient of a communication, would reasonably expect 
it to be kept confidential. 
It could be argued that memoranda and oral communications 
from law clerks to each other are subject to a lower expectation of 
confidentiality, assuming they do not directly or indirectly reveal 
communications by or to one of the Justices. However, if the Code 
means what it says about confidential communications from the 
chambers of the Justices, not just from the Justices themselves, 
clerks and other employees of the Court expect a zone of confiden­
tiality as well. Although this zone of confidentiality might not ex­
tend to clerks' discussion of their personal lives or jokes exchanged 
in the Court's cafeteria (neither of which should interest a serious 
109. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 ("A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation . . . .  "); 
MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 ("The confidentiality rule applies not merely 
to matters co=unicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to 
the representation, whatever its source."); MoDEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 
(discussing the attorney-client privilege as a related body of law). 
110. It is entirely possible that the content of such co=unications may come to light 
years later if the Justice leaves papers to a public repository. For example, memoranda writ­
ten by William Rehnquist when he was clerking for Justice Jackson about Brown v. Board of 
Education and other civil rights cases were a source of perceived embarrassment in Rehn­
quist's own confirmation hearings for Chief Justice in 1986. P. 146. 
111. CODE oF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canons 2 & 3 (emphasis added). 
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scholar of the Court anyway), it should extend to clerks' statements 
about their work on the Court. 
It is true that lawyers practicing in a firm do not, at least under 
codes of professional responsibility,112 owe each other a strict duty 
of confidentiality with respect to intrafirm conversations that do not 
contain confidential client information, disclose a lawyer's planned 
strategy on behalf of a client, or otherwise injure the lawyer-client 
relationship. This is, however, one area where the analogy to 
lawyer-client confidences is not on point. The principal objective of 
attorney-client confidentiality is unfettered disclosure of factual in­
formation by the client to the attorney, whereas the principal objec­
tive of confidentiality within a court, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, is unfettered communication of ideas about the law among 
persons who have a substantial role in interpreting the law. It is 
often helpful for clerks to ask each other about a case or an area of 
the law, and frankly discuss their opinions with each other, before 
communicating with their Justices. Clerks who fear adverse conse­
quences of unpopular ideas will not honestly express opinions to 
each other and may as a consequence be less likely to communicate 
informed opinions to their Justices. 
3. Electronic Communications 
Is there a legitimate expectation of privacy in e-mail communi­
cations between Justices and clerks, and between the clerks them­
selves? For example, would it be a violation of the Code of 
Conduct for a clerk to forward an e-mail from a Justice, or from 
another clerk, to a friend working outside the Court? 
The answer to both of these questions is "yes." E-mails be­
tween clerks and Justices or between clerks themselves, whether 
about a case or about an area of the law such as the death penalty, 
are subject to an expectation of confidentiality. Unauthorized in­
terception of an electronic communication, including e-mail, is a 
felony under federal law,113 and the Supreme Court's internal e-
112. Although codes of professional responsibility do not specifically require lawyers to 
keep each other's confidences, apart from their duty to keep client confidences, partnership 
or other law governing a firm's organizational structure might create such a duty among 
lawyers practicing together in the firm. 
113. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 
(1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994) (criminal penalties including up to five years in jail for repeat 
offenders); 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994) (civil relief including equitable and declaratory relief, 
damages, and attorney's fees); see also Lucy Schlauch Leonard, The High-Tech Legal Prac­
tice: Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 851, 859 (1998) 
("Interception of electronic communications is a federal felony under the Electronic Com­
munications Privacy Act ("ECPA") . . . .  [which was] passed in 1986 as an amendment to the 
1968 Federal Wrretapping Act in an effort by Congress to close loopholes in the Act that had 
been created by advances in technology. The ECPA provides criminal and civil penalties for 
the unauthorized access of stored electronic communications."). 
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mail system presumably should carry an even higher expectation of 
privacy than e-mail sent over the Internet. Users of that system 
also do not expect that a recipient of an e-mail would disseminate it 
outside of the courthouse. Furthermore, although there is some de­
bate over whether e-mail communications between lawyers and 
their clients are protected by the attorney-client privilege, 114 there 
is little disagreement that e-mail communications from a client are 
subject to the attorney's obligation to keep confidences and should 
not be voluntarily disclosed by the attorney.115 Likewise, down­
loading e-mail from the Supreme Court's system and giving it to a 
newspaper or author clearly violates a zone of expected confidenti­
ality. Such is not acceptable conduct for a clerk or anyone else. 
4. Actions 
Should a Justice have a legitimate expectation of privacy regard­
ing matters such as whether he listens while driving to audiotapes 
on pending cases prepared by his clerks,116 whether he watches tel­
evision in his chambers,117 or where he travels and how often?118 
Given the potential of such revelations to undermine the relation­
ship between Justices and their clerks, there are reasons to believe 
that both parties would expect such information to be kept private. 
In the lawyer-client relationship, the actions of the client ordina­
rily are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. For example, 
a court can force an attorney to divulge the amount of a bill the 
114. In several recent decisions, courts have extended the privilege to e-mail communica­
tions. See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 221 
(1994) (stating that e-mails between a party's corporate counsel and outside counsel were 
made in the outside counsel's professional capacity, and therefore were privileged and undis­
coverable); State ex reL United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 
1995) (e-mail communications held privileged). See generally Colleen L. Rest, Note, Elec­
tronic Mail and Confidential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk Management, 48 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 309, 336-37 (1998). 
115. Some jurisdictions even provide that the attorney's duty to take reasonable steps to 
assure confidentiality of client communications includes use of encryption or similar technol­
ogy. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, formal op. 96-
1 (1996) (stating that the duty to maintain client confidences under DR 4-101 requires attor­
neys to encrypt or provide similar protection for "sensitive material" sent to or from clients). 
Most jurisdictions, however, allow an attorney to decide on the appropriate level and method 
of protection on a case-by-case basis. 
116. See p. 394 (reporting that Justice Kennedy "did not ask for much in the way of 
written briefings on the cases, but, while driving, he sometimes listened to audiotapes his 
clerks prepared summarizing the essentials"). 
117. See p. 278 (confirming a report that Justice Marshall watched afternoon soaps in his 
office). 
118. See p. 279 (reporting that Justice Stevens was in Florida "for weeks at a time" and 
that "Stevens became the FedEx Justice, sometimes even telephoning his votes in to the 
Justices' weekly conference"). 
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client paid and probably even the whereabouts of the client.119 
However, such information is covered by the broader ethical obli­
gation of the lawyer to keep confidences learned in the course of 
the representation.120 Turning to another analogy, Secret Service 
agents can be required to testify about the conduct of the Presi­
dent.121 Few, however, would argue that a former Secret Service 
agent can ethically write a tell-all book about the President's sex 
life. Similarly, the close relationships that Supreme Court Justices 
develop with their clerks suggest an expectation on the part of both 
parties that clerks will not divulge details about a Justice's personal 
life. Furthermore, most information of this sort does not help us 
understand the Court, and its disclosure by a former clerk usually 
serves little purpose other than to satisfy fascination with gossip. 
5. Use of Confidential Information 
May a former law clerk use confidential information that he 
does not directly disclose? Rules concerning the use of confidential 
information are more amorphous and context-specific than rules 
prohibiting its disclosure,122 and the particular use to which the for­
mer clerk puts the information is a critical determinant of whether 
or not the use is proper. 
By way of illustration, it would be unethical and illegal for a 
clerk to trade in the securities markets based on non-public infor­
mation learned from his clerkship.123 At the other extreme, it 
would be permissible for a clerk to make a decision about his career 
based on information learned at the Court - for example, ac­
cepting a clerkship with another Justice for the following year based 
on observations of that Justice's approach to particular cases. Be-
119. See NooNAN & PAINrER, supra note 6, at 106 {"The identity or whereabouts of a 
client also are usually not protected; if demanded by a court or in a lawful subpoena this 
information must be disclosed by the lawyer."). 
120. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal informa· 
tion relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation . . • .  "); 
MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (a) cmt. 5 {"The confidentiality rule applies not 
merely to matters co=unicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relat· 
ing to the representation, whatever its source."); MODEL CoDE, supra note 48, DR 4-101 
(providing that a lawyer shall not knowingly "reveal a confidence or secret of his client" and 
defining a "confidence" to be "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under 
applicable law" and a "secret" to be "other information gained in the professional relation· 
ship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be em­
barrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client"). 
121. See In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3069, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16289, at *1 (D.C. Cir., 
July 16, 1998) (per curiam) ("[The Department of] Justice has not made a sufficient showing 
that irreparable harm will result unless a stay and an order are issued, and it has not made a 
sufficient showing that it will ultimately prevail in establishing the privilege it alleges."). 
122. Compare, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (prohibiting disclosure of 
confidential information without client consent) with Rule 1.8 (prohibiting use of client infor­
mation to the disadvantage of the client without client consent). 
123. See generally Painter et al., supra note 7. 
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tween these two extremes lie the many ways in which former law 
clerks, many of whom become law professors, use information from 
their clerkships to enrich articles and books about the Court and 
the cases it decides. In this area, there are few clear rules other 
than those prohibiting publication of confidential communications, 
although common sense suggests that additional caveats should be 
observed as well. 
First, indirect or covert disclosure of confidential information, 
for example by attributing it to unidentified sources or attributing 
truth to previously published rumor, is as reprehensible as direct 
and overt disclosure. There is little difference between a former 
clerk to Justice Breyer saying, "Justice Breyer told me that he has 
strong reservations about affirmative action" and the same clerk 
saying without citation to any specific source, "it is known at the 
Court that Justice Breyer has strong reservations about affirmative 
action." In the latter case, the author's statement, assuming it is 
true, is presumptively based on communications made by Justice 
Breyer to the author or to another clerk who then repeated them to 
the author. There is also little difference between a former clerk for 
the Court saying "Justice Marshall watched soap operas while his 
clerks wrote opinions" and saying that the National Review pub­
lished such a rumor that his clerks could protest but "could not 
deny" (p. 278). 
Second, a former clerk should either avoid writing about cases 
decided during his clerkship or carefully explain how he arrives at 
conclusions about those cases. If a former clerk for Justice Breyer 
writes of a case decided while he was a clerk, "Professor Smith's 
theory on why Justice Breyer changed his vote is wrong," the state­
ment implies that the writer knows this from his experience as a 
clerk, unless the writer clearly states how his conclusion is based on 
interpretation of another publicly available source, such as the case 
itself or another case. Clarifying one's reasoning and specifying 
one's sources avoids the appearance that confidential information is 
being misused or disclosed. 
On the other hand, it is permissible for a former clerk to use in 
later scholarly work the ideas that he formed while working on a 
case,124 so long as the clerk does not reveal what he said or wrote to 
the Justices about the case or what was said in response. Identifica­
tion of memoranda and draft opinions that are not already in pub­
licly available papers also would be improper. Similarly, in 
situations where the ethics of proper attribution require acknowl-
124. Both the Code of Conduct and federal criminal statutes, however, prohibit unau­
thorized removal of records from the Supreme Court building. See supra notes 35-42 and 
accompanying text. These prohibitions arguably apply to bench memoranda, making it diffi­
cult to rely extensively on one's own work product in a later scholarly work. 
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edgment of the original but confidential ideas of others, whether 
clerks or Justices, the ideas should not be used. 
Finally, a former clerk has more latitude when writing about 
terms other than the term during which she clerked, in part because 
events that happened during her clerkship are not likely to be cen­
tral to her analysis. Nonetheless, Justices do tell their clerks what 
they think about past cases and how they might decide an issue in 
the future, and the former clerk should be careful not to give the 
impression that she is conveying information about the content of 
these communications. Furthermore, former clerks from earlier or 
later years may be more likely to talk to another former clerk about 
what transpired during their terms simply because she can be ex­
pected to keep what is said (including hearsay about what the Jus­
tice said) confidential. Regardless of whether it is proper for clerks 
from different terms to have such conversations about the Court, 125 
the practice is tolerated precisely because the parties to the conver­
sation, and the Justices themselves, expect that information im­
parted when former clerks exchange "war stories" will not be 
communicated to a broader audience. These expectations should 
be respected. 
6. Role Change: Former Law Clerks as Journalists 
The roles of a law clerk and a journalist are very different. The 
clerk is charged with informing the Justice for whom he works, and 
occasionally other members of the Court, about the law and facts in 
cases before the Court. As discussed above, confidentiality be­
tween clerk and Justice is critical to effective performance of this 
role. The journalist, by contrast, is charged with informing the pub­
lic about newsworthy events, such as cases before the Court. Confi­
dentiality is important to the journalist's role only insofar as it is 
needed to protect the identity of sources who, without assurance of 
anonymity, would not divulge what the journalist wants to know. 
The roles of a lawyer and a journalist are also very different. 
The lawyer, like the journalist, has an obligation to pursue truth. 
The lawyer, however, pursues a partisan truth and works within the 
framework of a legal system which imposes restraints that the law­
yer must observe.126 Law and legal process are particularly impor-
125. Exchanging "war stories" in this manner is technically a violation of the confidential· 
ity provisions of the Code of Conduct, see supra text accompanying note 111, and would be a 
more serious violation if it were known that one of the parties to the conversation would 
disclose the content of the conversation to a broader audience. 
126. See generally Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report 
of the Joint Conference of the American Bar Association and the Association of American 
Law Schools, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958). 
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tant for the lawyer,127 and a lawyer is responsible for assuring that 
the persons she works with obey the law.128 The journalist, on the 
other hand, should obey the law in gathering information, but has a 
lesser responsibility for assuring that her sources comply with the 
law.129 Courts, for example, have usually refrained from enjoining 
publication of information that a journalist obtained because of 
someone else's violation of the law.130 
Sometimes these roles, and their respective ethical obligations, 
collide because a person performs one role and then seeks to per­
form another. Specific rules address the common changeover from 
the role of a law clerk to that of a lawyer, for example by disqualify­
ing a former clerk from cases on which she worked during her 
clerkship.131 The transition from law clerk to journalist, however, is 
not so easy, and is even more difficult if the clerk-turned-journalist 
also becomes a lawyer, as Lazarus did when he joined the bar in the 
midst of his work on Closed Chambers. Needless to say, the situa­
tion becomes even more precarious when the clerk-turned­
journalist-turned-lawyer chooses to be a federal prosecutor, who is 
sworn not only to uphold the law, but to enforce the law. 
It is not always easy to distinguish when these roles - some­
times assumed in succession and sometimes assumed concurrently 
- are separable along with the duties that flow with them. May a 
clerk-turned-journalist embrace the ethics of journalism, which per­
mit him to use information disclosed unethically by others? Must a 
lawyer carry the morals of the legal profession, which prohibit her 
from gathering evidence illegally or encouraging others to do so,132 
into her work as a journalist, or may she take off her lawyer's hat 
and put on that of a journalist? In any of these situations, should 
there be more tolerance for successive role conflicts (the clerk-
127. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, pmbl. 4 ("A lawyer's conduct should conform to 
the requirements of the law . . • . A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system 
. . . .  While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, 
it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process."). 
128. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 5.3 (stating that a lawyer is "responsi­
ble for conduct of [a non-lawyer employed or retained by or associated with the lawyer] that 
would be a violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a lawyer" if the 
lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct involved). 
129. See Felicity Barringer, New Rules, New Caution: Telling a Journalistic Coup from a 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, § 4, at 1 ("For journalists, it is second nature to draw a line 
between stealing information (forbidden) and accepting pilfered information (fine) . . . .  
Questions about the origin and highly classified status of the Pentagon Papers didn't keep 
The New York TIIlles and The Washington Post from publishing them in 1971. In fact, The 
TIIlles was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for public service."). 
130. See, e.g., New York TIIlles Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
131. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.11 ("Successive Government and 
Private Employment"). 
132. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 4.4 (stating that a lawyer may not use meth­
ods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of another person). 
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turned-journalist) than for conflicts that are concurrent (the clerk 
or lawyer who simultaneously works as a journalist)?133 
A few general observations. First, new ethical obligations do 
not erase old ones that would otherwise survive the termination of 
a past relationship (such as the duty to keep confidences). When 
new ethical obligations cannot be carried out without infringing 
upon old ones, the actor should withdraw from her new role. For 
example, if a journalist cannot write a factually accurate story with­
out breaching confidences from a prior clerkship, she should seek 
another assignment. New role-specific obligations usually are not 
forced upon actors, as new roles can be turned down. 
Second, when ethical obligations do not conflict, an actor may 
assume a second role, but with the caveat that conflict might occur 
in the future. A clerk-turned-journalist will experience few 
problems if she writes about something other than the term in 
which she was a clerk.134 H she does write about cases decided by 
the same court in the same term, she should use only the public 
record and carefully identify her sources. A former clerk who in­
stead offers anonymity to a source in return for information (jour­
nalists are not required to make such an offer) has no way of 
convincing her critics that she is not herself supplying the informa­
tion and attributing it to an unnamed source. If the clerk-turned­
journalist is also a lawyer, she confronts an additional dilemma if 
her source has violated the law or is a lawyer who has acted unethi­
cally, and she does not report him to the appropriate authority.135 
133. Such a distinction is made in the client conflicts area. Compare MoDEL RULES, 
supra note 49, Rule 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest: General Rule") (prohibiting concurrent repre­
sentation of a client with an interest adverse to another client in any matter) with Rule 1.9 
("Conflict of Interest: Former Client") (prohibiting successive representation of a client with 
an interest adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially related matter). 
134. The analysis is more ambiguous if the former clerk-turned-journalist is writing about 
a Term other than the one during which she clerked. Assuming the former clerk is not a 
lawyer, and thus has no continuing duty not to encourage or take advantage of ethical 
breaches by others, see supra text accompanying note 62, she arguably stands in a position no 
different from that of Woodward and Armstrong, the authors of The Brethren, when she 
interviews former clerks who are themselves breaching confidences. Her conduct may be 
particularly unseemly in view of the obligations that she previously had to the Court, but it is 
her sources, not she, who are breaching ethical obligations. Nonetheless, she probably 
crosses the line when she receives from her sources documents that were improperly re­
moved from the courthouse, see supra text accompanying notes 26-29. This concern is partic­
ularly serious if the documents existed at the time of her clerkship and she has no way of 
proving that she did not herself remove them from the building. Furthermore, the former­
clerk-turned-journalist acts unethically if she takes advantage of her status as a former clerk 
to induce other former clerks to disclose facts that they would not ordinarily disclose to 
outsiders, particularly if she does not inform them in advance that the information imparted 
will be disseminated publicly. See supra text accompanying note 125, concerning former 
clerks exchanging "war stories" that neither they nor the Justices expect to be shared with 
outsiders. 
135. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 8.3 (requiring a lawyer to inform the appro­
priate professional authority if she has knowledge of another lawyer's violation of the rules 
of professional conduct that "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trust-
May 1999] Clerk Confidentiality 1467 
She can avoid many of these problems, however, if she refrains 
from obtaining confidential information from sources who are un­
willing to be named. 
Third, like anyone, a former clerk should be careful not to as­
sume too many roles at once. Although the Code of Conduct pro­
hibits disclosure of the Court's confidences regardless of a clerk's 
subsequent status, Lazarus's assumption of the additional roles of 
lawyer and prosecutor only heightened his ethical obligations with 
respect to protecting the Court's confidences and the documents 
within its files. His publisher advertised his position with the 
United States Attorney on the dust jacket of Closed Chambers, but 
it was Lazarus's responsibility to ascertain and carry out the ethical 
obligations that this new position entailed.136 
7. How Long Does the Duty Survive? 
Lazarus has incorrectly argued that the Code of Conduct does 
not survive a clerkship,137 but he apparently does recognize some 
obligation of confidentiality, albeit an amorphous one, that survives 
the clerkship.138 His interpretation of this obligation, however, re­
fuses to define temporal boundaries and rests on a dubious distinc­
tion between that which is current and that which falls "into the 
realm of history,"139 the latter category apparently to be defined by 
each clerk-turned-historian according to his own moral compass. 
As a practical matter, this distinction admits just about any state­
ment that a former clerk wants to disclose into the realm of permis­
sible disclosure. 
Nonetheless, one may legitimately inquire as to whether there 
are any qualifications to the word "never" in the Code of Conduct. 
In particular, does the duty of confidentiality survive the death of 
the Justice who imparted a confidence? If not, does it still survive 
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects"); MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 8.4 
(stating that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "(c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" or "( d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice"); MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 8.4 cmt. 3 ("A lawyer's 
abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The 
same is true of abuse of positions of private trust . . . .  "). 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 62, 135. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58. 
138. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("[Q:] If it is to be an 
institution of fair adjudication, how much secrecy does the Supreme Court need, in your 
view? Lazarus: Well, I think a good starting point, it seems to me - during the time that a 
case is pending, it is absolutely imperative that the deliberative process be secret. And, on 
the other hand, at the other extreme, it seems to me that at some point, these things fall into 
the realm of history. And it's a little bit like one of Zeno's paradoxes: How many grains of 
sand does it take to make a sandhill? Where is the line? . . .  Somewhere between the time 
when the case is pending and a substantial time period later is the point where it does fall 
into the realm of history."). 
139. See id. 
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the death of all of the Justices on the Court at the time the commu­
nication was made? The answer should be grounded in the expec­
tations of the Justices themselves, and the Court's 1998 ruling that 
the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client140 sug­
gests that the Justices might also expect that their own confidences 
would be kept posthumously. Arguably, a Justice might have an 
even greater interest in keeping a communication, particularly a 
controversial communication, confidential after her death than 
when she is alive to explain it.141 On the other hand, communica­
tions about specific cases might no longer be sensitive years after 
those cases are decided, particularly if the Court is composed 
predominantly of new Justices. However, the decision about when 
confidences expire, if at all, is perhaps best made by the Justices 
themselves. 
8. Exceptions to Confidentiality 
Some exceptions to confidentiality are necessary. For example, 
in appropriate circumstances a court, prosecutor, or Congress 
should have the power to compel testimony by a former clerk about 
communications with a Justice. Evidence of judicial misconduct 
should be disclosed, whether in a criminal trial or impeachment 
hearing. A clerk should also disclose information necessary to in­
form other members of the same court or another court about im­
permissible conflict of interest or bias on the part of a judge or 
Justice hearing a case. Finally, a clerk should perhaps disclose 
statements by a judge that directly contradict the judge's subse­
quent sworn statements in a confirmation hearing for her own nom­
ination to a higher court or other office.142 
140. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, il8 S. Ct. 2081 {1998). 
141. The author of this review objected in a Wall Street Journal editorial that Lazarus 
published an unsubstantiated report that Justice Marshall once responded to an inquiry 
about the solution to racism by saying " 'Kill all the white people.'"  See Painter, supra note 8 
(quoting p. 278). Lazarus responded in his letter to the Journal that the remark was intended 
to be a "jest," and that Closed Chambers had given a "compliment" to Justice Marshall by 
reporting that he had said it. See Lazarus, supra note 46. This author does not share Laza­
rus's sense of humor. In any event, this is surely a compliment that Justice Marshall could do 
without. Lazarus also gives no specifics as to time, place, or names of \vitnesses. Further­
more, whatever Justice Marshall said he almost certainly said with the expectation that no­
body in the room would repeat his remarks publicly. He is not alive to defend himself, and 
his expectation of privacy should have been respected. 
142. Yet one more exception to the law clerk's duty to keep confidences should be disclo­
sure that is necessary for the clerk to defend herself against a negative performance review or 
reference letter from the judge. It would be unfair for the judge to document his difficulties 
working with the clerk while the clerk is estopped from explaining her side of the story. 
Indeed, the Model Rules contain an analogous exception to the lawyer's duty to keep client 
confidences. See MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 {1998) (providing that 
a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client"). 
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Arguments can be made for extending an evidentiary privilege 
to clerk-judge communications in at least some of these contexts.143 
Indeed, Lazarus's current employer, the Department of Justice, has 
unsuccessfully asked the Supreme Court to extend such an eviden­
tiary privilege to the relationship between the Secret Service anµ 
the President.144 However, when a court, a prosecutor, or Congress 
seeks for good cause to compel testimony about a Justice, the im­
portance of disclosure to the integrity of the judicial system is more 
compelling than when a former clerk writes a book about the 
Court. The evidentiary privilege generally is narrower that the duty 
to keep confidences,145 and it should be here as well. 
9. Disclosure by a Justice 
Regardless of whether Justice Blackmun knew about Closed 
Chambers while Lazarus was writing the book, important questions 
about the Justices' own duty to keep collfidences have been raised 
when Justices assist biographers, give or bequest their papers to 
public repositories, or allow scholars access to the same. Do the 
Justices owe each other a duty of confidentiality with respect to oral 
and written communications amongst themselves? May a Justice 
consent to disclosure by a law clerk or other person in her employ? 
Does such consent apply only to communications between the Jus­
tice and the clerk or also to communications by other Justices? 
May a Justice work with a biographer, or allow outsiders access to 
his papers without the permission of his fellow Justices? Unlike the 
obligation of clerks to keep confidences, these questions are not 
addressed by the Supreme Court's rules, although perhaps they 
should be. 
143. There is reason for concern. Assume the following: Conservative groups remember 
the short-lived initiative in the 1960's to "impeach Earl Warren" and once again call for 
Congress to investigate "activist judges" with an eye toward impeachment for abuse of 
power. The House Judiciary Committee decides to investigate, and begins to collect informa­
tion on a dozen judges on the appellate courts and two Supreme Court justices (pick any 
two). Former clerks are asked for information about how their bosses made decisions, the 
things they said in chambers, and anything else that could be used against them in impeach­
ment hearings. Some former clerks tum the information over voluntarily. Others hope to 
avoid subpoena by Congress. Query: It is ethical for the former clerks to voluntarily report 
on confidential communications with their judges or justices? The Code of Conduct would 
prohibit the disclosure, see CoDE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 3, and provides no 
exception to the ethical obligation to keep confidences, even where the information could be 
useful to Congress, which alone has the power to remove judges with life tenure. The more 
difficult question, and one that cannot be addressed fully in this book review, is whether 
there is, or ought to be, an absolute or qualified privilege that would prevent the former 
clerks from being subpoenaed and forced to testify. 
144. See In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3069, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16289 (D.C. Cir., July 16, 
1998) (per curiam). 
145. See MODEL CODE, supra note 48, EC 4-4 (1983) ("The attorney-client privilege is 
more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of 
his client."). 
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There are reasons why Justices should respect each other's con­
fidences, the most important being that candid communication 
among the Justices is critical to sound judicial decision making. A 
potential breach of confidence might even affect the outcome of a 
case in which a Justice would reverse her vote after private discus­
sions with her colleagues, but would adhere more steadfastly to her 
original position if she knew that the process by which she changed 
her mind would be aired publicly. Unilateral disclosure, if it be­
came the norm while Justices were still sitting on the Court, could 
also be used by individual Justices to coerce their colleagues or 
score points in the press. The threat of public disclosure of confi­
dences could thus become a weapon in the deliberative process it­
self, distorting results and causing Justices rarely to disclose to each 
other what they really think. Another concern is that a Justice, 
probably through a wholesale gift of unsorted papers to a public 
repository, could inadvertently disclose confidential communica­
tions that would embarrass a colleague while adding little to our 
understanding of the Court. 
On the other hand, public knowledge of how the Justices arrive 
at decisions is important. Interested persons include scholars of the 
Court and voters, as well as the President and Senators who shape 
the Court's future whenever they appoint and confirm a new Jus­
tice. Public revelations concerning the competency of a Justice, for 
example, might encourage an incompetent Justice to retire. Public 
revelations also might disclose that an excessive number of certain 
types of cases - for example death penalty cases - are interfering 
with the Court's other work, making statutory reform or creation of 
an intermediate appellate court an urgent necessity. Finally, revela­
tions that make the political component of the Court's decision­
making more transparent help its critics form an opinion about 
whether the Court should go in another direction. 
Regardless of how these factors in favor of and against disclo­
sure balance out, the Justices are in a better position than their 
clerks to weigh them and decide. The Justices have a greater inter­
est in the Court as an institution and thus an incentive not to make 
disclosures that undermine the Court's deliberative process. The 
Justices also are more likely to make comprehensive disclosures 
rather than disclosures pertaining only to a particular term. The 
Justices furthermore are less likely to be influenced by extraneous 
factors, such as financial gain or fame from disclosing each other's 
confidences. Finally, the law entrusts the Justices with responsibil­
ity for the Supreme Court as an institution, whereas clerks have no 
such authority or responsibility. Some decisions, such as which law 
clerks to hire, are made by the Justices individually. Others, such as 
the Court's procedural rules, are made collectively. It could be de­
bated whether one or all of the Justices who are part of a confiden-
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tial communication should consent to its disclosure, but the notion 
that a clerk has authority to make this determination on par with 
that of a Justice is absurd. 
CONCLUSION 
Lazarus's breach of trust not only raises ethical concerns, but 
contributes to the principal substantive weaknesses of the book: 
the obsession with goings on among law clerks, the failure to dis­
close sources, and the lack of credibility that both the book's author 
and his anonymous sources have earned. Many of these concerns 
would have been mitigated had Lazarus disclosed only that infor­
mation which he and his sources were ethically entitled to disclose, 
and he had then divulged the names of his sources and the complete 
text and origin of all documents that he used. Lazarus's commit­
ments to his sources may now be an obstacle to his disclosing their 
identity. Still, however, Lazarus would enhance the credibility and 
quality of his account in Closed Chambers if he were to open his 
own files and make his disclosure complete. 
